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RESOLVING THE DISJUNCTION BETWEEN
CULTURAL PROPERTY POLICY AND LAW:
A CALL FOR REFORM
Andrew L. Adler* & Stephen K. Urice**
ABSTRACT
Cultural property policy in the United States has become
increasingly lawless, for lack of a better term. In recent years, the
executive branch has aggressively restricted the movement of
cultural property into the United States, but it has repeatedly done
so without regard for constraining legal authority. The result is a
troubling disjunction between the executive branch's (the
"Executive") current cultural property policies and the existing legal
framework established by Congress and the Judiciary. We
document that disjunction in this Article.
We explain, for example, how the executive branch has recently
repatriated an Egyptian sarcophagus and an antique French
automobile to their respective countries of origin, but it disregarded
well-established judicial authority in the process. We explain how
the executive branch has similarly sought to repatriate cultural
objects to Italy, Peru, and Southeast Asia by relying on statutory
authority that Congress plainly never designed for such a purpose.
And we explain how the executive branch has imposed
comprehensive import restrictions on cultural property from around
the world without satisfying all of the statutory requirements
mandated by Congress.
In addition to documenting this disjunction between policy and
law, we situate it in its broader context. We submit that the
disjunction reflects an outdated legal framework. That framework
is the product of the 1970s, when the cultural property field was still
forming, and it has not incorporated the dramatic political and
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normative developments of the last three decades. We further
explain how the executive branch's willingness to disregard
statutory constraints raises serious and unresolved separation of
powers concerns. This precarious constitutional dynamic
undermines the democratic process and invites arbitrary
policymaking. We therefore argue that statutory reform is necessary
to resolve the disjunction, modernize the legal framework, and
restore the rule of law. We conclude by offering suggestions for
reform.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the executive branch ("the Executive") has
repeatedly restricted the movement of cultural property into the
United States without regard for constraining legal authority. In
this Article, we document this troubling, yet previously overlooked,
disjunction between policy and law. We propose that statutory
reform is necessary to accommodate the Executive's current policy
preferences and restore the rule of law. Moreover, given the
substantial normative developments in the field over the last three
decades, which largely coincide with current policy, we argue that
such reform is not only ripe but practicable.
The current legal framework governing the movement of cultural
property into the United States is a relic of the late 1970s and early
1980s, and it derives primarily from two federal statutes: the
National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA")1 and the Convention on
Cultural Property Implementation Act ("CCPIA").2
Although it now acts as the federal government's general theft
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (2006).
2. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-13 (2006).
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statute, the NSPA originally stems from Congress' desire to facilitate
the prosecution of automobile thieves who crossed state lines.3
Despite the fact that the NSPA was never intended to address the
unique issues surrounding cultural property, the Fifth Circuit's
seminal McClain decisions in the late 1970s4 ("McClain") effectively
transformed the statute into the Executive's principal legal
instrument for restricting the movement of cultural property into the
United States. Discussed in greater detail below, the Fifth Circuit in
McClain broadly interpreted the term "stolen" for purposes of the
NSPA to include antiquities illegally exported from foreign nations
that had declared ownership over them.5 Recognizing the potential
significance of McClain, archaeologists praised it as an advance in
efforts to stem the illegal export of cultural property, thereby
deterring unauthorized excavation and destruction of cultural sites.6
Art collectors and dealers, on the other hand, denounced McClain as
a wholesale reversal of long-standing U.S. policy promoting the free
movement of cultural property.7
Although McClain thrust the NSPA into the forefront of the
cultural property field, the underlying debate between the interested
stakeholders had been underway since before the start of that
decade. Indeed, in the late 1960s the United States had played a
critical role in drafting the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means
of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property ("1970 UNESCO Convention"),8
the central international legal instrument on the subject.9 The
3. See Stephen K. Urice, Between Rocks and Hard Places: Unprovenanced
Antiquities and the National Stolen Property Act, 40 N.M. L. REV. 123, 133-34 (2010)
(discussing the origins of the NSPA).
4. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979).
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See, e.g., Ellen Herscher, The Antiquities Market, 12 J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY
469 (1985) (reviewing testimony presented by the Archaeological Institute of America
to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Law praising McClain).
7. See, e.g., James R. McAlee, From the Boston Raphael to Peruvian Pots:
Limitations on the Importation of Art into the United States, 85 DICK. L. REV. 565, 580-
81 (1981) (discussing the negative reaction of the Council of the American Association
of Museums and the American Association of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental, and
Primitive Art).
8. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Convention
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter 1970
UNESCO Convention].
9. Andrew Adler, Book Review, 15 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 281, 281 (2010) (reviewing
PATRICK J. O'KEEFE, COMMENTARY ON THE 1970 UNESCO CONVENTION (2d ed. 2007)).
The other international legal instrument on the subject is the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention, which generally sought to establish uniform legal rules governing
restitution claims for stolen cultural objects and return claims for illicitly exported
2011]
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United States quickly ratified the Convention in 1972,10 but because
the Convention was not self-executing,"1 a long and fierce debate
ensued among the various stakeholders regarding how the United
States should implement it.12 Archaeologists sought a broad and
robust implementation regime that would restrict the importation of
cultural property, particularly antiquities, and require the United
States to return cultural property illegally exported from foreign
nations.13 Collectors and dealers, on the other hand, sought a more
limited and selective implementation that would permit a regulated
trade in cultural property. 14 It was not until 1983 that Congress was
finally able to broker a compromise and enact the CCPIA.15
Discussed in greater detail below, the CCPIA authorizes the
Executive to remedy situations of cultural pillage abroad by imposing
import restrictions on objects illegally exported from foreign nations;
critically, however, such restrictions are authorized only if exacting
statutory requirements are satisfied.16
Despite this delicate balance that Congress achieved in the
CCPIA, in recent years the Executive has increasingly taken a one-
sided approach and aggressively restricted the movement of cultural
property into the United States. We do not address the wisdom of
that policy but rather object to the cavalier method by which the
Executive has sought to achieve it. In pursuing this objective, the
Executive has disregarded the Judiciary's interpretation of the
NSPA, the compromises democratically embedded in the CCPIA, and
the long-standing prohibition against enforcing foreign export laws.
In this Article, we identify several examples illustrating this
disjunction between the Executive's cultural property policies and
the existing legal framework.
In Part I, we discuss the Justice Department's misapplication of
the NSPA, as that statute has been interpreted by the Judiciary.
cultural objects. UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1330.
10. 118 CONG. REC. S27,925 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1972).
11. The United States ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention with the
understanding that it would not be self-executing. Id.
12. See Asif Efrat, Protecting Against Plunder: The United States and the
International Efforts Against Looting of Antiquities 41-75 (Cornell Law Faculty
Working Papers, Paper No. 47, 2009), available at http://scholarship.law.
cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1049&context=clsopsE.papers (summarizing the
positions adopted by the various stakeholders during the legislative debate).
13. See id. at 43-49.
14. See id. at 49-60.
15. See Alexander A. Bauer, New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A
Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade Debates, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 690, 692
(2008) ("ITihe passage of the [CCPIA] in 1983 represented a rare compromise in what
has been more usually a vitriolic debate among the various parties involved.").
16. See infra Part III.A.
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Specifically, we explain that in two recent civil forfeiture complaints
premised on McClain, federal prosecutors have failed, as a matter of
law, to allege an underlying violation of the NSPA. Nonetheless, the
Executive succeeded in having both cultural objects returned to their
countries of origin.
In Part II, we discuss the Justice Department's international
application of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act
("ARPA").17 We identify three instances in which federal prosecutors
have successfully used ARPA, rather than the NSPA, to seek the
return of archaeological resources to the countries from which they
were allegedly stolen. Although there is no case law on point, we
contend that the international application of ARPA impermissibly
exceeds the scope of the statute, which Congress intended to apply
only to archaeological resources discovered within the United States.
In Part III, we discuss the State Department's imposition of
import restrictions under the CCPIA without regard for all of that
statute's requirements. We first summarize how primary source
documents revealed that, in 1997, the Executive had failed to comply
with the statutory criteria when imposing comprehensive import
restrictions on cultural property from Canada and Peru.18 Instead of
correcting the problem, we explain how the State Department
responded by perversely restricting public access to the information
necessary to monitor its statutory compliance.19 We then submit
that, despite this lack of transparency, the information that has been
released strongly suggests that the Executive continues to impose
broad import restrictions without regard for all of the statute's
requirements.20
While the cause of the Executive's willingness to disregard the
legal framework is not entirely clear, we suspect that it is due in no
small part to the fact that the legal framework is outdated. Indeed,
the framework was established at a time when the cultural property
field was nascent, there was no regulatory experience from which to
draw, the issues had not yet ripened, and the stakeholders'
arguments had not yet been fully refined.21 Over the last three
decades, however, the normative landscape has changed
substantially, as the stakeholders-particularly museums and
collectors-have increasingly taken more nuanced and pragmatic
approaches towards cultural property policy.
17. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-mm (2006).
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part III.C.
20. See infra Parts III.D-E.
21. The first law school text appeared in 1979, and the first art law treatise
appeared a few years earlier. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW,
ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1979); LEONARD D. DUBOFF,
THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW (1977).
2011]
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Several examples from the past decade illustrate this normative
shift. The American museum community has broadly adopted
guidelines making it a breach of professional ethics to acquire an
object without a clear provenance. 22 Self-regulating guidelines of this
sort would have been unthinkable to museum directors in the 1970s.
Moreover, several American museums, confronted with clear
evidence that objects in their collections had been recently looted,
have agreed to return those objects to their countries of origin.23
Similar evidence published in the late 1960s resulted in no such
action.24 The museum community's behavior has also affected
private collectors, as some have similarly agreed to return looted
objects in their collections to their countries of origin.25 Moreover, in
recent years the number of antiquities sold at public auction in the
United States has decreased,26 and the antiquities that have recently
come to auction with secure provenance have fetched premiums.27
That trend in the marketplace reflects a general, albeit not universal,
acceptance that objects likely to have been recently looted should be
shunned. Additionally, in the past decade several important market
nations have ratified or accepted the 1970 UNESCO Convention,
including the United Kingdom (2002), Japan (2002), Denmark (2003),
Switzerland (2003), Germany (2007), and the Netherlands (2009).28
22. See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The Revolution in U.S. Museums Concerning the
Ethics of Acquiring Antiquities, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 997, 1013-22 (2009) (discussing
these ethical guidelines); see also Urice, supra note 3, at 125 ("Provenance refers to the
history of an object and includes such information as when and by whom the object
was made, who owned it, and its record of publication, public exhibition, and
restoration or conservation. A related term, provenience, refers to an antiquity's
archaeological context or find spot; thus, an antiquity's provenience forms a part of its
provenance.") (footnote omitted).
23. See Kreder, supra note 22, at 1008-12 (discussing how several American
museums have recently returned cultural objects to source nations).
24. See Clemency Coggins, Illicit Traffic of Pre-Columbian Antiquities, 29 ART J.,
94, 94 (1969) (documenting that, during the 1960s, "there ha[d] been an incalculable
increase in the number of monuments systematically stolen, mutilated and illicitly
exported from Guatemala and Mexico in order to feed the international art market)
(alteration in original).
25. For example, in 2008, Shelby White, a New York philanthropist and
antiquities collector, agreed to return ten Italian antiquities that Italy asserted had
been recently looted. Elisabetta Povoledo, Collector Returns Art Italy Says Was
Looted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2008, at B1.
26. See, e.g., David Gill, Antiquities at Auction in New York, LOOTING MATTERS
(Jan. 5, 2010, 6:45 PM), http://lootingmatters.blogspot.com/2010/01/antiquities-at-
auction-in-new-york.html ("The antiquities market in New York seems to be in serious
decline. The overall sale of antiquities at Sotheby's and Christie's was down by over
$8.5 million [in 2009 as compared to 2008].').
27. See, e.g., Souren Melikian, The New Quest: Antiquities Beyond Reproach, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Dec. 18, 2010, at 17 (discussing the significant increase in prices
fetched for antiquities with pre-1970 provenance at recent public auctions).
28. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
[Vol. 64:1
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A broader dialogue has also emerged within the archaeological
community. The powerful voice of that community, led by the
Archaeological Institute of America ("AIA"), began to splinter in 2006
when a group of prominent archaeologists publicly criticized the
AIA's policy prohibiting the initial publication of unprovenanced
antiquities in its journals.29 This criticism demonstrates that even
the archaeological community has become more diverse in its
thinking.
Finally, a promising new dialogue has begun among the
stakeholders, as representatives from AIA and the Association of Art
Museum Directors met for the first time in 2010 to discuss how they
might cooperatively address the illicit trade.30 Such a conversation
could not have occurred back when the legal framework was first
established.
These developments in the normative landscape alone provide a
compelling reason for statutory reform. The legal framework is the
product of an era that has long since passed, and we believe it should
be modernized to reflect the more sophisticated dialogue taking place
today. Even more important, however, is that recent normative
developments largely coincide with the Executive's current policy
preferences. This convergence between the normative and political
landscape creates an optimal environment for statutory reform.
In addition to accounting for the normative and political
developments of the last three decades, statutory reform is also
necessary to restore the rule of law. The Executive's willingness to
disregard the legal framework raises serious separation of powers
concerns. In the famous words of Justice Jackson, by acting contrary
to the will of Congress, the Executive has been operating at the
"lowest ebb" of its constitutional authority.31 In recent years, this
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, UNESCO,
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (last visited Dec. 7,
2011).
29. Hugh Eakin, Must Looted Relics Be Ignored?, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at El.
30. Professor Urice attended this two-day meeting in Salem, Massachusetts, on
January 30-31, 2010.
31. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring). Justice Jackson's concurring opinion established a tripartite
framework for analyzing separation of powers disputes between the Executive and
Congress. Under the first category, "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express
or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes
all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate." Id. at 635.
Under the second category,
[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial
of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is
a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority,
or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter,
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.
2011]
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"lowest ebb" problem has become particularly acute in the national
security context, where the President has asserted with increasing
vigor that, as the Commander in Chief, he may disregard war-related
statutory constraints imposed by Congress.32 That assertion has led
to great disagreement about when, if ever, the Executive may
constitutionally exceed statutory constraints mandated by
Congress.33
The disjunction we identify here precariously injects the "lowest
ebb" conundrum into the cultural property context. Rather than
pitting the Commander in Chief power 34 against Congress' war
powers,35 the Executive's willingness to disregard the cultural
property legal framework pits the Executive's power to conduct
foreign affairs36 against Congress' power to regulate commerce.
37
There can be no doubt that the NSPA and the CCPIA are valid
exercises of Congress' constitutional power to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce, respectively. And while it is unlikely that the
Executive would normally have the constitutional authority to
confiscate private property in the United States3s--as it has
Id. at 637. Under the third category, "[w]hen the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter." Id. (emphasis added).
32. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
Lowest Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 689, 712-20 (2008) (describing the structural forces responsible for this shift);
see generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
Lowest Ebb-A Constitutional History, 121 HARv. L. REV. 941 (2008) (describing the
history behind this shift).
33. See, e.g., Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
259, 334 (2009) (arguing that "[i]n the event of a conflict between a statute or treaty
and the exercise of an implied presidential power, the statute or treaty prevails");
Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 32, at 706-11 (providing several
examples in which the administration of President George W. Bush actively advanced
the position that the President's Commander in Chief power could not be impinged by
Congress); see also Mark D. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: Against the View that
Jackson's Concurrence Resolves the Relation Between Congress and the Commander-in-
Chief, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1705-06 (2007) (arguing that "wherever congressional
power overlaps with antecedent presidential powers, congressional action categorically
trumps").
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I ('CThe President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States .... ).
35. See id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11-16 (granting Congress various war powers).
36. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the Executive the power, subject to the Senate's
advice and consent, to "make Treaties" and "appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls"); id. art. II, § 3, cl. 3 (granting the executive branch the power
to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers").
37. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "[tlo regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
38. See id. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
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effectively done in the examples described in Parts I and II- or to
restrict the importation of private property39--as it has effectively
done in the examples described in Part III- it is at least arguable,
though we remain skeptical, that the Executive may have such
authority where the property at issue is culturally affiliated with
foreign nations. In such cases, foreign policy considerations may be
implicated, thus triggering the Executive's constitutional power to
conduct foreign affairs. In short, just as in the national security
context, it remains unclear whether (and to what extent) the
Executive may constitutionally disregard statutory constraints in the
cultural property context.
We identify, rather than explore, this separation of powers
problem here because its very presence bolsters our call for statutory
reform. Indeed, we believe that, regardless of how the constitutional
issues are resolved, it is untenable for the Executive to continue to
make policy in disregard of the laws established by Congress. It will
create tension and instability between the branches; it will remove
Congress from the equation and thereby undermine the democratic
process; it will invite arbitrary and unconstrained policymaking by
the Executive; and it will create uncertainty among the stakeholders.
Thus, not only will statutory reform realign the legal framework with
the current normative and political landscape, but it will also avoid
this thorny constitutional issue and help restore legal order.
I. THE NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT
In this Part, we discuss the Justice Department's recent
application of the NSPA to cultural property in the United States
that was allegedly stolen from foreign nations. Specifically, we
highlight two civil forfeiture actions, referred to below as the French
Automobile case and the Egyptian Sarcophagus case, respectively.
We focus on these two actions in particular because, as a matter of
law, the federal prosecutors did not allege the underlying NSPA
violation upon which the forfeiture claim was predicated.
Nonetheless, because they encountered no opposition from the
claimants, both cultural objects were ultimately returned to their
country of origin.40 In order to explain why the forfeiture allegations
just compensation.').
39. See, e.g., Hans Aufricht, Presidential Power to Regulate Commerce and Lend-
Lease Transactions, 6 J. POL. 57, 60 (1944) ("Apparently, the only embargo
proclamation which has ever been issued without statutory authorization is Jefferson's
proclamation of July 2, 1807. But even in this case, the proclamation was submitted to
Congress for subsequent approval.").
40. In the French Automobile case, the government voluntarily dismissed the
forfeiture action after the claimant agreed to return the automobile to France.
Government's Motion to Dismiss Civil Case, Attached Stipulation for Settlement of
Civil Forfeiture Action at 6-10, United States v. 1 (One) French 1919 Vehicle (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 10, 2009) (No. 08-01825); see also Paul Shukovsky, Seattle Classic-Car Buff
2011]
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were legally insufficient, we first set out the relevant legal
parameters.
A. The Legal Parameters
The NSPA is a federal criminal statute prohibiting, inter alia,
the transportation, transmission, or transfer of any goods worth
$5,000 or more in interstate or foreign commerce, "knowing the same
to have been stolen."41 The statute also prohibits the receipt,
possession, concealment, storage, barter, sale, or disposition of such
goods if they have crossed a state or U.S. boundary, "knowing the
same to have been stolen."42 Significantly, an underlying violation of
the NSPA permits the government to bring an in rem civil forfeiture
action against the stolen property. 43
Although the NSPA is a general theft statute, distinct legal
issues have arisen when the government has applied it to cultural
property. The primary recurring issue in this context has been
whether a foreign nation's declaration of ownership over
undiscovered archaeological objects or antiquities-in the form of a
so-called patrimony law or vesting statute-renders such goods
"stolen" for purposes of the NSPA. To date, only three federal
appellate decisions have touched on the issue.44
Losing Prize to France, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 31, 2008, at Al (providing
background of the dispute).
In the Egyptian Sarcophagus case, the government obtained a default
judgment after the claimant failed to file a responsive pleading. Default Judgment of
Forfeiture, United States v. One Ancient Egyptian, Yellow Background, Wooden
Sarcophagus (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2009) (No. 09-23030); see also Press Release, U.S.
Customs and Border Prot., U.S. Returns Ancient Sarcophagus to Egypt at Nat'l
Geographic Soc'y (Mar. 10, 2010), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xpcgov
newsroom/news releases/archives/2010_newsreleases/march_2010/03102010_7.xml
(reporting the sarcophagus's return to Egypt).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2006).
42. Id. § 2315.
43. Civil forfeiture actions for stolen property are authorized under various
statutes. See 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2006) (authorizing civil forfeiture of merchandise
brought into the country "contrary to law"); 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (2006)
(authorizing civil forfeiture of personal property that constitutes or is derived from
proceeds traceable to a violation of, inter alia, a "specified unlawful activity," which
includes violations of the NSPA); 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) (2006) (authorizing civil
forfeiture of stolen merchandise brought into the country); 19 U.S.C. §§ 2607, 2609(a)
(2006) (authorizing civil forfeiture of cultural property that is stolen from "a museum
or religious or secular public monument or similar institution" in any country that has
ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention).
44. Two federal district courts have also addressed the issue in the civil forfeiture
context. See United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. 222, 231-32
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding, in the alternative, that an Italian patrimony law sufficiently
vested ownership for purposes of rendering an object "stolen" under the NSPA), affd
on other grounds, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Pre-Columbian
Artifacts, 845 F. Supp. 544, 547 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (same, with respect to Guatemalan
CULTURAL PROPERTY POLICY AND LAW
The first is the Ninth Circuit's 1974 decision in United States v.
Hollinshead.45 In that case, the federal government obtained a
criminal conviction under the NSPA against two men for
transporting a well-documented, pre-Columbian Mayan stele into the
United States.46 The prosecution's theory of the case apparently was
that the stele was owned by, and thus stolen from, Guatemala by
virtue of a Guatemalan patrimony law.47
Significantly, however, the defendants did not challenge the
prosecution's theory on appeal,48 effectively conceding that
Guatemala's patrimony law vested the nation with a form of
ownership sufficient to trigger the NSPA.49 A close reading of
Hollinshead thus reveals that, because the issue was not presented
on appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not hold that a foreign nation's
patrimony law could support a NSPA violation; instead, the court did
no more than tacitly assume-without deciding-that the
prosecution's legal theory in this regard was valid,
In the seminal case of United States v. McClain, the government
obtained criminal convictions under the NSPA against several
defendants for transporting and receiving pre-Columbian artifacts
originating in Mexico.50 The government proceeded under the same
legal theory used in Hollinshead, but this time the defendants
directly challenged the theory's validity on appeal.51
In a thorough opinion, the Fifth Circuit in 1977 held that a
national declaration of ownership, coupled with the fact of illegal
exportation, rendered an object stolen for purposes of the NSPA.52
law).
45. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
46. Id. at 1155.
47. See id.; see also Appellee's Brief at 8-10, 40, United States v. Hollinshead, 495
F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974) (No. 73-2525) (reviewing the testimony presented at trial,
including testimony elicited by the government that Guatemala had declared
ownership over the stele and that it was unlawfully exported from the country).
48. Instead, the defendants unsuccessfully raised nine claims of error not relevant
here. See Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1155-56.
49. It is a well-established rule of federal appellate procedure that arguments not
raised by an appellant on appeal are deemed abandoned. See, e.g., United States v.
Williamson, 439 F.3d 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006) ("With no argument presented, we
decline to address the claim. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(9)(A) requires
that the argument in an appellant's brief contain the appellant's contentions and the
reasons for them. . . .We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant ....
especially where a host of other issues are presented for review.") (internal citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 991-92 (5th Cir. 1977).
51. Id. at 993-94.
52. Id. at 1000-01 ("We hold that a declaration of national ownership is necessary
before illegal exportation of an article can be considered theft, and the exported article
considered 'stolen', within the meaning of the National Stolen Property Act. Such a
declaration combined with a restriction on exportation without consent of the owner
2011]
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The court summarized its rationale as follows:
This conclusion is a result of our attempt to reconcile the doctrine
of strict construction of criminal statutes with the broad
significance attached to the word "stolen" in the NSPA. Were the
word to be so narrowly construed as to exclude coverage, for
example, with respect to pre-Columbian artifacts illegally exported
from Mexico after the effective date of the 1972 [patrimony] law,
the Mexican government would be denied protection of the Act
after it had done all it reasonably could do-vested itself with
ownership-to protect its interest in the artifacts. This would
violate the apparent objective of Congress: the protection of owners
of stolen property. If, on the other hand, an object were considered
"stolen" merely because it was illegally exported, the meaning of
the term "stolen" would be stretched beyond its conventional
meaning.53
Significantly, the court repeatedly emphasized the distinction
between a national declaration of ownership and a mere restriction
on illegal export. 54 This critical distinction was rooted in the court's
acceptance of the rule that the United States does not enforce the
export laws of other countries absent a treaty or statute providing
otherwise.55
The Court then applied this distinction by carefully parsing a
series of Mexican patrimony laws in search for a clear declaration of
ownership.56 It ultimately concluded that, contrary to the district
court's jury instruction, Mexico's 1897 patrimony law was an export
restriction, not a declaration of ownership, and that Mexico did not
clearly declare ownership over the artifacts in question until 1972.57
Thus, the court vacated the convictions because the artifacts could be
considered stolen only if they were illegally exported after Mexico's
declaration of ownership became effective, and the jury had not been
(Mexico) is sufficient to bring the NSPA into play.") (footnotes omitted).
53. Id. at 1001-02 (footnotes omitted).
54. See id. at 996-97; id. at 1002 (We distinguish, therefore, between varying
types of governmental control over property within the borders of a state ...
[R]estrictions on exportation are just like any other police power restrictions. They do
not create 'ownership' in the state.").
55. Id. at 996 ('CThe general rule today in the United States, and I think in almost
all other art-importing countries, is that it is not a violation of law to import simply
because an item has been illegally exported from another country. This is a
fundamental general rule today with respect to art importation.... This means that a
person who imports a work of art which has been illegally exported is not for that
reason alone actionable, and the possession of that work cannot for that reason alone
be disturbed in the United States.") (quoting Paul M. Bator, International Trade in
National Art Treasures: Regulation and Deregulation, in ART LAW, DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL 295, 300 (Leonard D. DuBoffed., 1975)) (alteration in original).
56. McClain, 545 F.2d at 997-1001.
57. Id. at 1000.
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instructed to determine when the artifacts had been exported.58
More than twenty years later, the third (and, to date, last)
federal appellate court addressed the issue. In United States v.
Schultz, the government proceeded under the legal theory validated
in McClain and obtained a criminal conviction against a defendant
under the NSPA for conspiring to receive Egyptian antiquities. 59 The
defendant challenged the legitimacy of the government's theory on
appeal,60 but the Second Circuit, relying heavily on McClain,
"conclude[d] that the NSPA applies to property that is stolen from a
foreign government, where that government asserts actual
ownership of the property pursuant to a valid patrimony law."61
Significantly, the court followed the Fifth Circuit's example by
analyzing whether the 1983 Egyptian patrimony law relied upon
constituted a declaration of ownership or merely restricted illegal
export. 62 Emphasizing the unequivocal language of the patrimony
law, as well as Egypt's active enforcement of the law,63 the court
concluded that the patrimony law was a true ownership law, not an
export restriction.64 The Second Circuit thus made clear, as the Fifth
Circuit had in McClain, that the distinction between a declaration of
ownership and a mere export restriction was central to its holding.65
58. Id. at 1003-04. Four of the five defendants were re-tried and convicted, and
they again appealed to the Fifth Circuit. United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658, 659-
60 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1979). In that appeal, the court concluded it was bound under the
law of the case doctrine by the prior panel's holding that Mexico's patrimony law,
coupled with illegal export, triggered liability under the NSPA. Id. at 664-66. While
the court ultimately affirmed the defendants' convictions for conspiracy to violate the
NSPA, it vacated their substantive NSPA convictions on grounds not relevant here.
See id. at 665-72.
59. United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 395-96 (2d Cir. 2003).
60. Id. at 398-99, 402.
61. Id. at 416. In addition to relying on the unambiguous language of the statute
and the broad construction traditionally afforded to the word "stolen," the court
explicitly "agree[d] that the Fifth Circuit reached the proper balance [among the]
competing concerns in McClain." Id. at 399, 402-04, 409- 10.
62. Id. at 403-04.
63. Although most of the literature assumes that Schultz adopted McClain
wholesale, we believe that Schultz's reliance on Egypt's active, domestic enforcement
of its patrimony law meaningfully distinguishes the case from McClain, where such
enforcement was absent. Urice, supra note 3, at 145-47.
64. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 399-402, 404-08; see id. at 407-08 ("Schultz contends that
it is United States policy not to enforce the export restrictions of foreign nations.
Schultz offers no evidence in support of this assertion, but even if his assessment of
United States policy is accurate, the outcome of this case is unaffected. We have
already concluded, based on the plain language of [the patrimony law] and the
evidence in the record, that [the patrimony law] is an ownership law, not an export-
restriction law. . . . [The patrimony law] is more than an export regulation-it is a
true ownership law.").
65. Indeed, in its conclusion, the court expressed confidence that lower courts
would be "capable of evaluating foreign patrimony laws to determine whether their
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B. The French Automobile Case
In December 2008, federal prosecutors brought an in rem civil
forfeiture action in the Western District of Washington against an
antique French automobile.66 The government sought forfeiture on
two alternative grounds. First, the government asserted that the
automobile was subject to forfeiture because the importer made
materially false statements on customs forms.67 Second, the
government asserted that the automobile was subject to forfeiture
under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A) because it constituted stolen
property under the NSPA.6s While we take no issue with the
government's first forfeiture claim,69 it appears that the
government's second claim is without legal basis.
The government alleged the following facts.70 The automobile
was manufactured in 1919 at the request of the Duc de Montpensier,
a descendant of the Orleans branch of the Bourbon Dynasty and
owner of the French castle of Randan.71 Upon his death in 1924, title
to the automobile passed to his wife; she subsequently married
Alberto de Huarte, who inherited the automobile upon her death in
language and enforcement indicate that they are intended to assert true ownership of
certain property, or merely to restrict the export of that property." Id. at 410.
66. Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in Rem, United States v. 1 (One) French 1919
Vehicle (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2008) (No. 08-01825).
67. Id. at Attachment "A," Aff. of Special Agent Thomas W. Penn 4-5, 24-26
[hereinafter Penn Aff.]. The government brought this forfeiture claim pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 545-authorizing civil forfeiture of any merchandise introduced into the
country "contrary to law"-based on an underlying violation of 18 U.S.C. § 542,
prohibiting making materially false statements on customs forms. According to the
sworn affidavit attached to the complaint, the importer erroneously stated that the
value of the automobile was $420,000, when in fact it was closer to twice that value,
and that the automobile's country of origin was the Netherlands, when in fact it was
France. Id. [ 4-5, 14, 16-19, 26 & n.4.
68. Id. 27-28; see 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A) (2006) (authorizing the civil
forfeiture of "stolen" merchandise introduced into the United States).
69. Under the law in the Ninth Circuit, where the action was brought, the
importer's false statements regarding the automobile's value and country of origin
would be considered material for purposes of § 542 if the truth would have actually
prevented the automobile's entry into the country. United States v. Teraoka, 669 F.2d
577, 579 (9th Cir. 1982). This "but for" standard is more favorable to the importer
than the "natural tendency" standard adopted by other circuits. See, e.g., United
States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a
false statement is material if a "reasonable customs official would consider the
statement ] to be significant to the exercise of his or her official duties").
70. The government's verified complaint essentially incorporated, without
elaboration, an attached affidavit prepared by an Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE") special agent containing both the facts of the investigation and
the legal basis of forfeiture claims; we therefore cite to that affidavit. Verified
Complaint, supra note 66, at 3.
71. Penn Aff., supra note 67, 6. For an image of this "completely unique"
automobile, see Shukovsky, supra note 40.
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1958.72 In 1991, the French government classified the Randan estate
and all of the goods conserved there, including the automobile, as
historical monuments. 73 The effect of this classification was to
prohibit the permanent export of the automobile from France under
the French Heritage Code.74 In 1997, de Huarte sold the automobile
in France to Antoine Raffaelli, who sold it in 2003 to Bruno
Vendiesse, a seller of classic cars based in France.75 Despite the
restriction on permanent export, Vendiesse sent the automobile in
2004 from France to J. Braam Ruben in the Netherlands, who
brokered a sale of the automobile to Charles Morse, a resident of
Seattle, Washington.76 The automobile arrived in Seattle from the
Netherlands the following year.77
After reciting these factual allegations, the government set out
its 'legal basis"78 of forfeiture by asserting that the automobile was
"stolen" from France "[b]y virtue of its being taken from France in
violation of the French Heritage Code."79 For support, the
government provided the following citation: "See United States v.
Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 404 (2nd [sic] Cir. 2003) ("The Ninth Circuit's
discussion indicates its acceptance of the prosecution's theory in
Hollinshead: that an object is 'stolen' within the meaning of the
NSPA if it is taken in violation of a patrimony law.")."s0
The government's purported legal basis of this forfeiture claim is
deficient. Even assuming that Hollinshead could be interpreted as
implicitly adopting McClain's definition of stolen, the government's
forfeiture claim would still amount to the enforcement of France's
export restrictions. Despite citing Schultz, the government overlooks
the critical distinction between laws declaring ownership and export
restrictions. The provision in the French Heritage Code upon which
the government relied is an export restriction on its face;81 and the
government referred to it as such, seemingly unaware that this fact
would render its forfeiture claim contrary to the very case law upon
72. Penn Aff., supra note 67, 7.
73. Id. 8 & n.2.
74. Id. 9 & n.2. The English translation of the applicable provision in the French
Heritage Code provided: "The export out of France of items classified as Historical
Monuments is forbidden, without detriment to the provisions regarding... temporary
export .. " Id. $ 9 n.3.
75. Id. 10-12.





81. Penn Aff., supra note 67, at 3 n.3.
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which it relied.82 Because it is undisputed that France never
declared itself the owner of the automobile, its illegal export,
standing alone, could not have rendered it legally stolen for purposes
of the NSPA. In this respect, not only did the government fail to
allege that France owned the automobile, but it also failed to allege
any theft whatsoever. To the contrary, the government set out a
clear chain of title to the automobile from the original owner to the
U.S. importer.83
C. The Egyptian Sarcophagus Case
In October 2009, federal prosecutors brought an in rem civil
forfeiture action in the Southern District of Florida against an
ancient Egyptian sarcophagus.84 The government brought this action
again pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A), authorizing the civil
forfeiture of "stolen" merchandise introduced into the United
States.85 Although the government did not cite the NSPA, the
verified complaint reveals that the government proceeded under the
legal theory validated in McClain and Schultz.86 Although McClain
is binding precedent in the Southern District of Florida,87 the
government's complaint does not allege a violation of the NSPA as
interpreted by the Fifth Circuit.
The government's complaint alleged the following:88 In
September 2008, Joseph A. Lewis II imported an Egyptian
sarcophagus constructed between 1070 and 946 B.C. into the United
States from Barcelona, Spain.89 Lewis purchased the sarcophagus
from Felix Cervera Correa, the owner of a Spanish gallery.90 In his
entry documentation, Lewis stated that the provenance of the
82. See id. 9, 13, 22, 28. The government notably referred to a letter sent to
ICE by the Deputy French Director of Historical Monuments and Protected Areas
detailing the specific export violations that occurred in connection with the automobile.
Id. 22.
83. See id. TI 6-17.
84. Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in Rem, United States v. One Ancient
Egyptian, Yellow Background, Wooden Sarcophagus (S.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2009) (No. 09-
23030).
85. Id. 2, 52-54.
86. See id. 38-44, 47, 51-52.
87. The Southern District of Florida is part of the Eleventh Circuit, which has
adopted as binding precedent all decisions issued by the Fifth Circuit before October 1,
1981, the date that Congress divided the former Fifth Circuit into the current Fifth
Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
88. A special agent with ICE swore to these facts under the penalty of perjury.
Verified Complaint, supra note 84, at 8.
89. Id. 5, 11, 12-16.
90. Id. 7 9-12. The entry documentation filed by Lewis revealed a sale price of
15,000 euro and a (roughly equivalent) market value of approximately $21,894. Id. 77
17-18.
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sarcophagus was the Buendia Collection.91 Although he did not have
an art collection, Miguel Angel Buendia "stated [that] he 'found' the
[sarcophagus] during a series of trips he did around Europe and
Egypt in the 1970s.... Buendia [did] not produce[ any
documentation regarding when he obtained the [sarcophagus] and
from whom he obtained [it]."92 He sold the sarcophagus to Cervera's
father some time in the early 1970s. 93 Cervera admitted that he
lacked an Egyptian export license and that such a license "probably
never ha[d] been done."94 Cervera also obtained a report from the
Art Loss Register providing that the sarcophagus had not been
reported missing or stolen.95 U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement contacted Zahi Hawass, the Secretary General of the
Egyptian Supreme Council of Antiquities, who surmised that,
because Egypt was unable to locate any information regarding the
approval of the sarcophagus's export, it was "likely the product of an
illegal excavation."96
After reciting these factual allegations, the government's
complaint quoted from a series of Egyptian antiquities laws.
Specifically, it quoted from the following: an 1835 ordinance banning
the exportation of antiquities; an 1874 regulation asserting that
"[a]ny undiscovered antique piece (lying under the ground) in any
location, belongs to the Government;" 'an 1883 order asserting that
all antiques located in Egyptian museums were "the state's public
property;" an 1891 decree asserting that "[a]ll of the objects found in
excavations belong by right to the State;" a 1912 law declaring that
"every antiquity found on, or in the ground, shall belong to the Public
Domain of the State;" a 1951 law declaring that, subject to certain
exceptions, "[aill antique edifices, furnishings and land... shall be
part of the public domain;" and a 1983 law (the same one analyzed in
Schultz) declaring that "[a]ll antiquities are considered public
property except" those held in a prescribed form of charitable trust.97
91. Id. 19.
92. Id. %T 20-22.
93. Id. 23-24. Buendia stated that he sold the sarcophagus to Cervera's father,
co-owner of the Spanish gallery, in 1972; Cervera's father stated that he acquired it
from Buendia in December 1970. Id. J 9-10, 23-24.
94. Id. T$ 26-27.
95. Id. 28.
96. Id. IT 29-32; see also id. 46 (stating that documentation of the sarcophagus's
export still had not been found as of the filing of the complaint on October 8, 2009).
97. Id. IT 38-45. There are several peculiarities worth noting here. First, it is
unclear why the government quoted the 1835 Ordinance, since it is nothing more than
an export restriction on its face. Second, it is unclear why the government quoted the
1883 Order, which appears to pertain only to documented artifacts located in a
museum. Third, it is unclear why the government quoted the 1951 Law, which would
not apply to the sarcophagus. Finally, the government offered no explanation as to
how the various laws related to each other.
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The government then set out its "Claim for Forfeiture"98 as
follows: "[slince at least 1874, Egypt has had in place, patrimony
laws, which... indicate that any antique piece belongs to the
government of Egypt[;]"99 the sarcophagus was exported from Egypt
without the government's permission;100 the sarcophagus was
"removed from Egypt in violation of Egyptian law[;]"101 and the
sarcophagus was therefore "stolen,"102 rendering it subject to
forfeiture.103
However, the government's claim for forfeiture is legally
deficient because it does not allege when the sarcophagus left
Egypt.104 This omission is critical because in order for the
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id. 48. This reliance on the 1874 provision again raises the question why the
government quoted the earlier 1835 Ordinance restricting export. See id. 38.
100. Id. 50.
101. Id. 51. The government did not identify the Egyptian law or laws to which it
was referring.
102. Id. 52. This critical paragraph of the complaint stated in its entirety as
follows: 'The [sarcophagus] was stolen from Egypt." Id.
103. Id. 53-54.
104. Although news reports covering the case provide conflicting accounts on when
the sarcophagus first left Egypt, that fact does not appear in the complaint. Compare
Egypt to Receive Stolen Sarcophagus from US, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 22, 2010,
available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2010/02/22/
egypt to-receive-stolen_sarcophagusjfromus/ (reporting that "U.S. authorities
determined the sarcophagus had left Egypt some time after 1970"), with Hadeel Al-
Shalchi, Stolen sarcophagus returns to Egypt from U.S., ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 13,
2010, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2011334676_
apmlegyptstolensarcophagus.html ("An investigation found the coffin had been stolen
from Egypt 126 years ago .... I), and Steven McElroy, Egypt Requests Coffin's Return,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, at C2 (reporting that Egypt "sent documents to authorities
in Miami proving that the coffin was taken out of Egypt illegally in 1884"); see also
Pre-1970 Provenance No Safe Harbor for Egyptian Antiquities?, CULTURAL PROPERTY
OBSERVER (Mar. 14, 2010, 8:04 AM), http://culturalpropertvobserver.blogspot.com/
2010/03/pre-1970-provenance-no-safe-harbor-for.html (comment by Sofi on Mar. 15,
2010, 9:04 PM) ("I have not seen a single article on this coffin with the correct facts so
far .... Hawass' only claim to this item . . . was the lack of an export permit from
Egypt[;] in fact he stated that the Egyptian government had no idea whatsoever when
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sarcophagus to be considered stolen under McClain, it must have
been unlawfully taken from Egypt after Egypt clearly vested itself
with ownership. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit vacated the defendants'
convictions in McClain precisely because the jury did not find that
the artifacts left Mexico after the effective date of the patrimony
law.105 Thus, even if the government were correct that Egypt clearly
vested itself with ownership over all antiquities since 1874,106 that
assertion, by itself, is legally incomplete; only if the sarcophagus was
illegally exported after that patrimony law became effective could it
be stolen. Moreover, by failing to allege this critical fact, the
government's complaint effectively sought to enforce Egypt's export
restrictions,107 which, as discussed above, squarely conflicts with the
holding in McClain.
II. THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES PROTECTION ACT
In this Part, we discuss the Justice Department's unexplained
decision to apply the Archaeological Resources Protection Act
(ARPA),lOS instead of the NSPA, to cultural property allegedly stolen
from abroad. We explain that, although Congress expressly intended
ARPA to apply only to archaeological resources originating within
the United States, federal prosecutors have nonetheless applied it to
foreign archaeological resources in the United States. Although
there is no case law on point, in our view, the government's
international application of ARPA exceeds the scope of the statute
and flouts legislative intent.109 It is also unnecessary.
this coffin left Egypt as they had no record of this item - period."). Indeed, the
government openly acknowledged in the complaint that Buendia provided no
documentation regarding when or where he obtained the sarcophagus. Verified
Complaint, supra note 84, 22. Moreover, the government's allegation that Buendia
stated that he "found" the sarcophagus "during a series of trips he did around Europe
and Egypt in the 1970s" does not go to when the sarcophagus first left Egypt. See id.
21.
105. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1003 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Peru v.
Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810, 812-15 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that, in the context of a
civil replevin action, Peru did not meet its burden of proof in part because it could not
establish that it was the "legal owner [over the artifacts in question] at the time of
their removal from that country"), aff'd sub. nom. Peru v. Wendt, 933 F.2d 1013 (9th
Cir. 1991) (No. 90-55521, 1991 Term).
106. It is noteworthy that the government was able to rely exclusively on Egypt's
1983 patrimony law in Schultz, because the illegal export in that case occurred after
1983. See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 396-98 (2d Cir. 2003).
107. By failing to allege when the sarcophagus left Egypt, the government also
arguably failed to allege illegal export. Although the government sufficiently alleged
that Egypt had not authorized the export of the sarcophagus, there is nothing to
indicate that such authorization was legally required (since there is nothing to
indicate when the export occurred).
108. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-mm (2006).
109. In advancing this argument, we rely upon and summarize a prior article.
Andrew Adler, An Unintended and Absurd Expansion: The Application of the
2011]
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Congress enacted ARPA in 1979110 to combat the rise of
unauthorized archaeological excavation on public (i.e., federal) and
Indian lands1", within the United States.112 The preamble113 and
savings clausell4 of the statute, its legislative history,115 and the fact
that it largely superseded the Antiquities Act of 1906 (which was
limited to lands controlled by the federal government),116 all confirm
this unambiguous legislative intent. 117
Nevertheless, federal prosecutors have applied ARPA to
archaeological resources originating outside the United States on at
least three occasions. First, in December 1996, prosecutors brought
"an in rem civil forfeiture [action] pursuant to ARPA" in the
Southern District of New York against Etruscan artifacts;118 because
no claimant filed a responsive pleading, the government obtained a
default judgment. 119 Second, in 2003, a Virginia man pled guilty to a
criminal violation of ARPA for attempting to sell a number of
Peruvian artifacts.120 Third, in January 2008, prosecutors obtained
search warrants against California museums by alleging violations of
ARPA in connection with the museums' possession of various Asian
and Native American antiquities.121 Due to the procedural posture of
Archaeological Resources Protection Act to Foreign Lands, 38 N.M. L. REV. 133 (2008).
110. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat.
721.
111. For the statutory definition of public and Indian lands, see 16 U.S.C. §§
470bb(3)-(4) (2006).
112. Adler, supra note 109, at 140 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-311, at 15-16 (1979),
reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1709, 1718-19).
113. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (2006) ("The purpose of this chapter is to secure, for the
present and future benefit of the American people, the protection of archaeological
resources and sites which are on public lands and Indian lands .... ).
114. Id. § 470kk(c) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect any land
other than public land or Indian land ... ").
115. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 96-311, at 13 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1709, 1716 ('The lands involved in the legislation are entirely Federally owned or
Indian lands ... ").
116. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (2006); see United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1115
(7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that ARPA "superseded the Antiquities Act of 1906, which
had been expressly limited to federal lands") (internal citation omitted). Congress
found it necessary to supersede the Antiquities Act because the Ninth Circuit had
concluded that the term "object[s] of antiquity' was unconstitutionally vague," and
because the statute prescribed meager penalties. Adler, supra note 109, at 140-41.
117. Adler, supra note 109, at 140-41, 145-47.
118. Id. at 143 (citing Verified Complaint 1, United States v. An Archaic Etruscan
Pottery Ceremonial Vase, No. 96 CIV. 9437 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1996)).
119. Adler, supra note 109, at 143 (citing Default Judgment, United States v. An
Archaic Etruscan Pottery Ceremonial Vase, No. 96 CIV. 9437 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,
1997)).
120. Adler, supra note 109, at 143-44 (citing Maria Glod, Arlington Man Pleads
Guilty to Selling Protected Artifacts, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2003, at B3).
121. Adler, supra note 109, at 144 (citing Search Warrant on Written Affidavit 4,
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these three cases, no court had the occasion to rule on this
application of ARPA to cultural property originating in foreign
nations. 122
In all three examples, the government relied on 16 U.S.C. §
470ee(c), a provision in ARPA prohibiting the sale, purchase,
exchange, transport, or receipt of "any archaeological resource
excavated, removed, sold, purchased, exchanged, transported, or
received in violation of any provision, rule, regulation, ordinance, or
permit in effect under State or local law."123 Prosecutors purported to
satisfy § 470ee(c) by coupling state theft laws with foreign patrimony
laws. Under their theory, the illegal export of archaeological
resources from a nation with a patrimony law rendered those objects
stolen; it was a violation of state theft laws to receive stolen property;
and it was therefore a violation of § 470ee(c) to sell, purchase,
exchange, transport, or receive such objects, regardless of their
country of origin.124
Viewed in isolation, the plain language of § 470ee(c) might be
capable of accommodating the government's unwieldy theory.125
However, in our view this theory is irreconcilable with legislative
intent in two major respects. First, Congress designed § 470ee(c) to
reinforce state-not foreign-laws protecting archaeological sites.126
10, United States v. The Premises Known As: Charles W. Bowers Museum Corp., No.
08-0093M (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2008); Search Warrant on Written Affidavit 3(a), 6,
United States v. The Premises Known As: Los Angeles County Museum of Art, No. 08-
0lOOM (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2008); and Search Warrant on Written Affidavit 4, 8,
United States v. The Premises Known as: Pacific Asia Museum, No. 08-0118M (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 22, 2008)).
122. Adler, supra note 109, at 143.
123. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c) (2006). Section 470ee(c) is the third type of prohibited act
under ARPA; the first two prohibit the unauthorized excavation and trafficking of
archaeological resources on federal and Indian lands. Id. §§ 470ee(a)-(b). Not only
does a violation of these prohibitions give rise to criminal liability, id. § 470ee(d), but it
permits the government to bring a civil forfeiture action against the object(s). Id. §
470gg(b).
124. Adler, supra note 109, at 144-45.
125. So far as we are aware, the only scholarly authority advocating the
international application of ARPA is conclusory and fails to explain the legality or
utility behind such application. See Patty Gerstenblith, Increasing Effectiveness of the
Legal Regime for the Protection of the International Archaeological Heritage, in
CULTURAL HERITAGE ISSUES: THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST, COLONIZATION, AND
COMMERCE 305, 306 (James A.R. Nafziger & Ann M. Nicgorski, eds., 2009) (simply
stating that "ARPA ... is primarily concerned with sites and artifacts found on
federally owned or controlled land" and "prohibits trafficking in inter-state or foreign
commerce").
126. See United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining
that § 470ee(c) was "designed to back up state and local laws protecting archaeological
sites and objects," thus "resembl[ing] . . . a host of other federal statutes that affix
federal criminal penalties to state crimes that, when committed in interstate
commerce, are difficult for individual states to punish or prevent because coordinating
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
Congress has proven itself capable of expressly authorizing the
enforcement of foreign law when it so desires,127 and it provided no
such authority in § 470ee(c). Second, the government's international
application of § 470ee(c) produces an absurd result because Congress'
overriding, unambiguous objective in enacting ARPA was to protect
archaeological resources originating in the United States.12s Thus,
the government's interpretation runs contrary to the purpose of both
§ 470ee(c) and the statute as a whole.
We remain puzzled as to why the Justice Department has
advanced this application of ARPA, especially given that the NSPA
provides broad statutory authority to address the same problem.129
Regardless of motivation, we acknowledge that the Executive is
generally free to advance novel interpretations of the statutes it
enforces, at least where, as here, there is no judicial authority
foreclosing such interpretations. Nonetheless, the absence of such
judicial authority in no way detracts from our view that the
international application of ARPA is statutorily improper.
Consequently, a necessary component of the statutory reform we
propose would clarify that ARPA applies only to archaeological
resources discovered within the United States.
III. THE CONVENTION ON CULTURAL PROPERTY IMPLEMENTATION ACT
In this Part, we discuss import restrictions imposed pursuant to
the CCPIA. In doing so, we focus on several instances in which it
appears that the Executive has imposed import restrictions without
regard for all of that statute's requirements. We begin with the
relevant legal parameters.
A. The Legal Parameters
As mentioned at the outset, the CCPIA represents the United
States' domestic implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.
Although the United States quickly ratified the Convention in
1972,130 it took Congress more than ten years to enact the CCPIA due
to the conflicting positions adopted by the various stakeholders (e.g.,
archaeologists, dealers, collectors, museums, and governmental
institutions). 131
the law enforcement efforts of different states is difficult").
127. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(2)-(3) (prohibiting various acts involving fish and
wildlife that are taken "in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation
of any foreign law").
128. Adler, supra note 109, at 149-50 & n.118, 152-53.
129. But see id. at 156 & nn.143-44 (speculating that ARPA's mens rea requirement
would be less strict than the NSPA's scienter requirement).
130. 118 CONG. REC. S27,925 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1972).
131. See Efrat, supra note 12, at 41-75 (summarizing the positions adopted by the
various stakeholders during the legislative debate).
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The duration and intensity of the legislative debate resulted in a
statute characterized by two important attributes. First, the CCPIA
emerged as the most comprehensive and definitive statement of
cultural property policy in the United States. 132 Second, the statute
"reflect[ed] an elaborate compromise designed to balance the
competing interests of US museums, the art market, the US public,
archaeologists, and source nations."133 This balance that Congress
struck is reflected in the structure of the statute and its effectuating
mechanisms.
The CCPJA primarily implements Article 9 of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention134 by authorizing the President135 to impose import
restrictions on specific categories of archaeological and ethnological
materials that have been unlawfully exported-so long as specific
criteria are satisfied.136 This general statutory approach itself
reflects an important compromise: on the one hand, the statute
authorizes the United States to enforce the export restrictions of
132. See Douglas Ewing, What is "Stolen'?: The McClain Case Revisited, in THE
ETHICS OF COLLECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY: WHOSE CULTURE? WHOSE PROPERTY?
177, 182 (Phyllis Mauch Messenger ed., 2d ed. 1999) ("Throughout the decade-long
series of debates and discussion and extraordinary congressional mark-up sessions, it
was acknowledged by all parties, private and public, that what we were in fact doing
was formulating a national cultural property policy.").
133. William Pearlstein, Cultural Property, Congress, the Courts, and Customs: The
Decline and Fall of the Antiquities Market?, in WHO OWNS THE PAST?: CULTURAL
POLICY, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 9, 10 (Kate Fitz Gibbon ed., 2005)
[hereinafter WHO OWNS THE PAST?]; see also Bauer, supra note 15, at 692 ("[T]he
passage of [CCPIA] in 1983 represented a rare compromise in what has been more
usually a vitriolic debate among the various parties involved.").
134. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 8, art. 9 ("Any State Party to this
Convention whose cultural patrimony is in jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or
ethnological materials may call upon other States Parties who are affected. The States
Parties to this Convention undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a
concerted international effort to determine and to carry out the necessary concrete
measures, including the control of exports and imports and international commerce in
the specific materials concerned. Pending agreement each State concerned shall take
provisional measures to the extent feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the
cultural heritage of the requesting State.").
135. In 1986, President Reagan delegated his functions under the CCPIA primarily
to the United States Information Agency ("USIA") and delegated the remaining
functions to the Departments of State, Treasury, and Interior. Exec. Order No. 12,555,
51 Fed. Reg. 8,475 (1986). In 1998, Congress abolished the USIA and transferred its
functions to the State Department. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. XIII, §§ 1311-12,
112 Stat. 2681, 2681-776 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6531-32 (2006)). In 2003,
President George W. Bush transferred the previous delegation of authority to the
Department of the Treasury to the Department of Homeland Security. Exec. Order
No. 13,286, 3 C.F.R. 166, 166 (2004). Thus, today the Executive's primary authority
under the CCPIA is delegated to the State Department, with the remaining authority
delegated to the Departments of Homeland Security and Interior.
136. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
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foreign nations, thus modifying the default rule against such
enforcement;137 on the other hand, because Congress considered such
import restrictions to be "drastic" measures, 138 especially for a
country committed to open borders and free trade,139 Congress
ensured that they could be imposed only if exacting criteria were
satisfied.
Aside from a provision governing "emergency" situations of
pillage,140 four substantive statutory criteria must be met before the
Executive--"President" in the statute-may impose import
restrictions. First, and following directly from Article 9, the
Executive must determine "that the cultural patrimony of the State
Party is in jeopardy from the pillage of archaeological or ethnological
materials of the State Party."141 Second, the Executive must
determine "that the [requesting] State Party has taken measures
consistent with the [1970 UNESCO] Convention to protect its
cultural patrimony."142 The third statutory criterion has two
components: First, the Executive must determine that U.S. import
restrictions, "if applied in concert with similar restrictions
implemented, or to be implemented within a reasonable period of
time, by those nations (whether or not State Parties) individually
having a significant import trade in such material, would be of
substantial benefit in deterring a serious situation of pillage[;]"143
137. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
138. See § 2602(a)(1)(C)(ii) (referring to import restrictions as a "drastic" remedy).
139. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 275, 343 (1982) (explaining that the United States has historically allowed for
the "[uJnrestricted and free trade in the arts").
140. In order to implement the "irremediable injury" component of Article 9, the
statute authorizes the Executive to impose import restrictions in response to
"emergency" situations of pillage. 19 U.S.C. § 2603(b) (2006). If the Executive
determines that an "emergency" situation exists, see id. § 2603(a) (defining three such
situations), it may impose import restrictions for five years, which may be renewed for
an additional three years. Id. § 2603(b), (c)(3). The Executive has imposed seven sets
of emergency import restrictions under the CCPIA, the most recent occurring in 1999
(Cambodia and Cyprus). See Import Restrictions List & Chart, US DEP'T OF STATE,
http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/listactions.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2011). While § 2603 constitutes an important grant of authority, we only briefly
mention it because there are currently no emergency restrictions in place, and it does
not impact our analysis below.
141. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(A) (2006).
142. Id. § 2602(a)(1)(B).
143. Id. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(i). There is a limited exception to this statutory criterion.
See id. § 2602(c)(2) (authorizing the President to impose import restrictions even
where "a nation individually having a significant import trade in such material is not
implementing, or is not likely to implement, similar restrictions," so long as the
President determines that "such restrictions are not essential to deter a serious
situation of pillage, and ... the application of [U.S.] import restrictions . . . in concert
with similar restrictions implemented, or to be implemented, by other nations
(whether or not State Parties) individually having a significant import trade in such
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and second, the Executive must determine that "remedies less drastic
than the application of the restrictions set forth in such section are
not available."144 Fourth, the Executive must determine "that the
application of the import restrictions ... in the particular
circumstances is consistent with the general interest of the
international community in the interchange of cultural property
among nations for scientific, cultural, and educational purposes."145
In addition to these four statutory criteria, there is an essential
structural feature of the statute further limiting the imposition of
import restrictions. In accordance with Article 9 of the Convention,
the CCPIA authorizes the Executive to impose import restrictions
only if there is a request for assistance from a foreign nation.146 By
conditioning the Executive's authority upon the receipt of such a
request, 147 the statute limits discretion and ensures that import
restrictions will be imposed only on a reactive, rather than a
proactive, basis.
If the statutory criteria are satisfied, the statute authorizes the
Executive to enter into a bilateral agreement-sometimes referred to
as a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU")-with the requesting
country and impose import restrictions pursuant thereto.148 These
bilateral agreements expire after five years, but the Executive may
renew them for additional five-year periods if it determines that the
statutory criteria remain satisfied149 At present, the United States
has bilateral agreements with twelve nations. 150
material would be of substantial benefit in deterring a serious situation of pillage").
The statute also notably requires the President to suspend import restrictions
if he determines that "a number of parties to the agreement (other than parties
described in subsection (c)(2).. .) having significant import trade in the archaeological
and ethnological material covered by the agreement ... have not implemented within
a reasonable period of time import restrictions that are similar to [U.S. import
restrictions]" or "are not implementing such restrictions satisfactorily with the result
that no substantial benefit in deterring a serious situation of pillage in the State Party
concerned is being obtained." Id. § 2602(d).
144. Id. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(ii).
145. Id. § 2602(a)(1)(D).
146. Id. §§ 2602(a)(1), 2602(a)(3), 2603(c)(1).
147. There need not be an additional request to extend import restrictions already
imposed. See id. §§ 2602(e), 2603(c)(3).
148. Id. § 2602(a)(2)(A). The statute also authorizes the President to enter into
multilateral agreements, but no such agreements have been entered in to thus far.
See id. § 2602(a)(2)(B).
149. Id. § 2602(e).
150. Import Restrictions List & Chart, US DEP'T OF STATE,
http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/listactions.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
The Executive has also imposed import restrictions on Iraqi archaeological and
ethnological materials, pursuant to the Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural
Antiquities Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-429, 118 Stat. 2434, 2599-2600, tit. III, §§
3001-03. See Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological and Ethnological
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In order to ensure that the Executive was provided with the
expertise necessary to evaluate the statutory criteria, Congress
established the Cultural Property Advisory Committee ("CPAC").151
The primary responsibility of CPAC is to review requests for, and
renewals of, import restrictions and to prepare reports advising the
Executive of the appropriate action to take in light of the statutory
criteria.152 As an advisory committee, CPAC is generally subject to
the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA"),153 including its
requirement that advisory committees be "fairly balanced in terms of
the points of view represented."54 Consistent with this requirement,
as well as the balanced nature of the CCPIA itself, Congress carefully
prescribed CPAC's membership in order to ensure "fair
representation of the various interests of the public sectors and the
private sectors."155 To achieve such representation, Congress
mandated that the eleven-member committee be constituted as
follows: two members must represent the "interests of museums[;"
three members must have expertise in archaeology, anthropology, or
ethnology; three members must have expertise in the "international
sale" of cultural property; and three members must "represent the
interests of the general public."156 Although originally housed in the
United States Information Agency ("USIA"), CPAC migrated to the
State Department in 1999.157 As a result, CPAC's Executive Director
Material of Iraq, 73 Fed. Reg. 23,334 (Apr. 30, 2008) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12).
151. 19 U.S.C. § 2605 (2006); see also S. REP. No. 97-564, at 25 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4102 ('"The Cultural Property Advisory Committee ... will
render the expert advice necessary to understand these terms in the context of
particular cases.").
152. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602(f)(3), 2603(c)(2), 2605(f) (2006). The Committee is also
charged with conducting an ongoing review of import restrictions previously imposed
under the statute. Id. § 2605(g)(1).
153. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2006).
154. Id. § 5(b)(2). The CCPIA exempts CPAC from certain FACA provisions
"relating to open meetings, public notice, public participation, and public availability of
documents." 19 U.S.C. § 2605(h). The CCPIA also contains a related provision on
confidential information. Id. § 2605(i).
155. 19 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(2)(A).
156. Id. § 2605(b)(1). Members are private citizens "appointed for terms of three
years and may be reappointed for one or more terms." Id. § 2605(b)(3)(A).
157. See Reorganization Plan and Report Submitted by President Clinton to the
Congress on December 30, 1998, Pursuant to Section 1601 of the Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, as Contained in Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2(d)
(Oct. 21, 1998); The Who, What, Why and How of the Cultural Property Advisory
Committee (CPAC).',An IFAR Evening, April 17, 2008, 10 IFAR J. Nos. 3 & 4, at 24, 48
n.4 (2008-09) [hereinafter IFAR Evening]. Specifically, CPAC is subsumed under the
International Cultural Property Protection Program, which is part of the Cultural
Heritage Center, which is part of the State Department's Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs. See Cultural Property Advisory Committee, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/committee.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
On the delegation of the President's functions under the CCPIA, see supra note 135.
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and supporting staff are permanent State Department employees. 158
B. The Cases of Canada and Peru
Not long after the Executive began using the CCPIA in the late
1980s, it was revealed that import restrictions were not actually
being imposed in accordance with the statute. 159 In 1998, James
Fitzpatrick, a private attorney who represented antiquities' dealers,
published an article referred to here as Stealth UNIDROIT.160
Armed with primary source materials-namely, original country
requests for import restrictions and CPAC's resulting reports-
Fitzpatrick explained how in 1997 the Executive had failed to satisfy
the CCPIA's criteria when imposing comprehensive import
restrictions on Canadian and Peruvian archaeological and
ethnological materials. 161
In the Canadian case, the Executive had imposed import
restrictions of a "breathtaking" scope, covering "virtually all Native
American archaeological and ethnological works in Canada, dating
from... 10,000 B.C. to the very recent past."162 Fitzpatrick revealed
that the first statutory criterion had not been satisfied because there
had been no showing that Canadian Native American archaeological
158. See 19 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1) (granting CPAC "administrative and technical
support services and assistance").
159. This was not the first controversy involving the Executive's disregard for the
CCPIA. During the brief three-month interval between the Senate's final legislative
report and the statute's enactment, the U.S. Customs Service, relying on McClain,
promulgated a directive that sought to enforce foreign ownership laws and impose a
comprehensive embargo on Pre-Columbian artifacts. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE,
SEIZURE AND DETENTION OF PRE-COLUMBIAN ARTIFACTS, POLICIES & PROCEDURES
MANUAL Supp. No. 3280-01 (Oct. 5, 1982). As others have previously explained, this
Customs directive was utterly incompatible with the CCPIA, for it contradicted
"virtually every key conclusion of Congress." James F. Fitzpatrick, A Wayward Course:
The Lawless Customs Policy Toward Cultural Properties, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
857, 864-85 (1983); see James R. McAlee, The McClain Case, Customs, and Congress,
15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 813, 829-34, 36-37 (1983) (discussing Customs' reliance on
McClain and asserting that the directive was incompatible with the CCPIA).
160. James F. Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT: Is USIA the Villain?, 31 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 47 (1998) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROI7.
161. By imposing such comprehensive import restrictions, Fitzpatrick believed that
the USIA was effectively enforcing foreign nations' export restrictions, a policy that
had been rejected by the United States when it declined to join the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention; hence the article's title. Id. at 77 ("The Canadian and Peruvian
agreements reflect that the [C]CPIA has become an instrument to enforce foreign
export control laws. Of course, that was the goal of UNIDROIT[,] which was so
overwhelmingly and vigorously rejected by the entire U.S. museum, dealer, and
collector community such that the Government has apparently abandoned its efforts to
seek the Treaty's Congressional ratification.").
162. Id. at 55; see also Archaeological and Ethnological Material from Canada, 62
Fed. Reg. 19,488 (Apr. 22, 1997) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12).
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or ethnological materials were currently in jeopardy of pillage.163
Instead, the import restrictions were predicated on historical
incidents of looting and the existence of a market in the United
States for such materials.164 Fitzpatrick explained (correctly in our
view) that those two purported justifications were legally irrelevant,
since the first criterion requires a finding of contemporary pillage-a
conclusion compelled both by the present-tense language of the
statute and its unmistakable purpose to deter ongoing looting
abroad. 165
Fitzpatrick also revealed that there was "no proof in the
administrative record" demonstrating compliance with the third
statutory criterionl66--requiring that U.S. import restrictions be
"applied in concert with similar restrictions implemented, or to be
implemented within a reasonable period of time, by ... nations ...
having a significant import trade in such material."167 Fitzpatrick
explained that, although USIA16s and CPAC concluded simply that
the United States was the only nation with a significant import trade
in Canadian Native American items, a survey contained in CPAC's
own report indicated that approximately one quarter of the trade
163. Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 56-67. With respect to
restricted objects pertaining to "four out of the six" tribal groups, "there was no specific
contemporary evidence of pillage" at all. Id. at 56. With respect to objects pertaining
to the remaining two tribal groups, only one specific example of contemporary pillage
was cited in each case, which was hardly sufficient to support the respective bans
covering objects produced over 8,000- and 12,000-year periods. Id. at 63-65; see also
infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text (explaining that the CCPIA requires
evidence of contemporary pillage affecting the specific categories of items subject to
import restrictions).
164. Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 56-59, 61-63, 65.
165. Id. at 50-52, 50 n.12, 59, 61, 63-65, 67; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(A) (2006)
(requiring the Executive to determine "that the cultural patrimony of the State Party
is in jeopardy from the pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials of the State
Party") (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 97-564, at 21 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4098 (explaining that the statute would authorize import
restrictions on "archaeological or ethnological materials specifically identified as
comprising a part of a state's cultural patrimony that is in danger of being pillaged")
(emphasis added); Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 72 ("From the
beginning, Congress has targeted situations of contemporary pillage because
restricting the market for those goods would have a direct and immediate impact on
pillage. One simply cannot refer to [historical] pillage . . . as statutory evidence of
contemporary looting and include those particular goods on an embargo list because
any action on behalf of the United States today would not affect such historical
'pillage."') (emphasis in original); cf. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 875 &
n.15 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding, consistent with Supreme Court precedent, that
"Congress' use of the present tense [was] significant" in construing the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act).
166. Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 67.
167. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(i) (2006).
168. See supra text accompanying note 157.
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passed through London auction houses.169 Thus, Fitzpatrick
concluded (again, correctly in our view) that this quantity constituted
a "significant" import trade; and because the record did not indicate
that the United Kingdom had enacted or planned to enact "similar
restrictions," the third criterion had not been satisfied.170
Only a few months later, the Executive imposed similar
comprehensive import restrictions on virtually the "entire cultural
heritage" of Peru, encompassing archaeological and ethnological
materials dating from 12,000 B.C. to 1821 A.D.171 In evaluating the
legality of these import restrictions-again by referring to Peru's
request and CPAC's report-Fitzpatrick identified the same two
statutory deficiencies.
With respect to the first statutory criterion, he concluded that
"[a] review of the Committee Report reflect[ed] the dramatic failure
to support the wholesale import restrictions with evidence of actual
pillage," since "[t]here [was] no doubt that the proof of pillage in Peru
does not extend to the full range, 13,000 years, of embargoed
goods."172 Fitzpatrick based this conclusion on the requirement that
there must be evidence of contemporary pillage affecting the specific
category of items to be restricted.173 This requirement is compelled
both by the plain language of the statute and its legislative
history.174 Thus, although the record contained limited examples of
contemporary pillage,175 these examples justified only "rifle-shot"
169. Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 68.
170. Id. We discuss this aspect of the third criterion in further depth below. See
infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
171. Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 68-70; Archaeological and
Ethnological Material from Peru, 62 Fed. Reg. 31,712, 31,713 (June 11, 1997) (to be
codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12).
172. Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 69-70.
173. Id. at 70.
174. See 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(2)(A) (2006) (authorizing the Executive to apply import
restrictions only "to the archaeological or ethnological material of the State Party the
pillage of which is creating the jeopardy to the cultural patrimony of the State Party");
S. REP. No. 97-564, at 21 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4098
(explaining that the statute authorized the Executive to "apply specific import or other
controls (upon the request of a State Party) to archaeological or ethnological materials
specifically identified as comprising a part of a state's cultural patrimony that is in
danger of being pillaged") (emphasis added). We assume here that the contemporary
pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials would necessarily jeopardize the
cultural patrimony of the requesting nation.
175. Specifically, the CPAC report emphasized "fifty-one thefts of ethnographic
materials . . . taken largely from provincial churches[,]" Fitzpatrick, Stealth
UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 70-71, and the Peruvian request highlighted eleven
incidents of looting or vandalism at eight archaeological sites. Id. at 72-73. Peru also
identified looting at two additional sites, but it did not seek protection for materials
from those sites. Id. at 73-74. Fitzpatrick also acknowledged that the Sipan Region of
Peru was subject to contemporary pillage, but he correctly pointed out that the United
States already had imposed emergency import restrictions on materials from there.
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restrictions, not a "comprehensive embargo" on Peru's "entire
cultural heritage"176 As in the Canadian case, "[t]he Peruvian
request [was] essentially premised on numerous references to the
long history of looting[,]" which, as explained above, would not satisfy
the first statutory criterion.177
Fitzpatrick also concluded that "[t]here [was] a clear failure of
proof" with respect to the third statutory criterion, because there was
"no showing that any major market abroad [was] following the
United States's total ban."178 Although the Peruvian request
identified markets in Peruvian goods in several countries abroad,
CPAC relied only on the fact that some of these countries had
ratified, or signaled their intent to ratify, the 1970 UNESCO
Convention or the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.179 However,
Fitzpatrick explained (again, correctly in our view) that merely
ratifying one of these treaties, by itself, "is a far cry from having
'similar restrictions' in place."180 Fitzpatrick further revealed that,
with the "possible exception of Canada," there was no evidence in the
record that any of these nations were "in fact barring [or intending to
bar] any Peruvian goods, let alone imposing the comprehensive ban
that the [United States] approved."S1
C. The Onset of Secrecy
Rather than ameliorating Fitzpatrick's findings, which to this
day have never been challenged in print, the State Department
perversely responded by eliminating transparency with respect to its
implementation of the CCPIA. So far as we are aware, the State
Department has not released any original country requests since the
publication of Stealth UNIDROIT, and we have been able to obtain
Id. at 70, 73 ("At best, the experience with... Sipan suggests only that this agreement
should be continued, not that a far broader embargo be instituted under the law."); see
Import Restrictions Imposed on Significant Archaeological Artifacts from Peru, 55 Fed.
Reg. 19,029 (May 7, 1990) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12).
176. Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 70, 73-74.
177. Id. at 72.
178. Id. at 74-75.
179. Id. Specifically, there were markets in Brazil, Denmark, England, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland; and the Executive
pointed to the fact that Brazil, Canada, France, and Italy had ratified the 1970
UNESCO Convention, and that France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands had signed
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. Id. at 74-75. In this respect, and although not
discussed by Fitzpatrick, it is noteworthy that the Executive might have, but did not
appear to, invoke the limited statutory exception to the requirement that all nations
with a significant import trade enact "similar restrictions." 19 U.S.C. § 2602(c)(2)
(2006); see S. REP. No. 97-564, at 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4105
(referring to this exception as a "limited" one).
180. Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 75; see infra notes 198-204
and accompanying text.
181. Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 75.
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only one, nonredacted CPAC report (the 2000 report on the Italian
request).182 This lack of transparency itself borders on lawlessness;
for example, the State Department recently denied a congressman's
written request for two CPAC reports, 8 3 even though the CCPIA
requires the submission of those very reports to Congress. 184
This lack of transparency has not always been the case. In 1987,
the United States for the first time imposed import restrictions
pursuant to the CCPIA, in response to an emergency situation of
pillage in El Salvador.185 Two years later, then-Executive Director of
CPAC, Ann Guthrie Hingston, published an article detailing and
quoting from both El Salvador's request for import restrictions and
CPAC's resulting report.1 8 6  And in 1993, CPAC voluntarily
182. Letter from Francis Terry McNamara, Co-Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, to
Peter K. Tompa, Counsel for the Int'l Ass'n of Profl Numismatists (Mar. 22, 2004) (on
file with the authors) (releasing REPORT OF THE CULTURAL PROPERTY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON THE REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY
RECOMMENDING U.S. IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF
ARCHAEOLOGICAL MATERIAL (2000) [hereinafter CPAC REPORT ON ITALIAN REQUEST]
(on file with the authors)).
We have obtained five additional CPAC reports, but those copies are all heavily
(and, in some instances, completely) redacted with respect to the statutory criteria.
See infra Part III.D. Thus, we refer only to the nonredacted 2000 report on the Italian
request in our discussion of the statutory criteria. See REPORT OF THE CULTURAL
PROPERTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE PROPOSAL To EXTEND THE MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA &
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS CONCERNING THE IMPOSITION OF
IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON PRE-CLASSICAL AND CLASSICAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL MATERIAL
AND BYZANTINE PERIOD ECCLESIASTICAL AND RITUAL ETHNOLOGICAL MATERIALS
(2007) [hereinafter 2007 CPAC REPORT ON CYPRIOT EXTENSION] (on file with the
authors); THE REPORT OF THE CULTURAL PROPERTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE
PROPOSAL TO EXTEND THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA & THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY CONCERNING THE
IMPOSITION OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON CATEGORIES OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL MATERIAL
REPRESENTING THE PRE-CLASSICAL, CLASSICAL, & IMPERIAL ROMAN PERIODS OF ITALY
(2005) (on file with the authors); CULTURAL PROPERTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT
ON THE PROPOSAL TO EXTEND THE 1999 EMERGENCY ACTION ON BYZANTINE
ECCLESIASTICAL AND RITUAL ETHNOLOGICAL MATERIAL FROM CYPRUS (2003) (on file
with the authors); REPORT OF THE CULTURAL PROPERTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE
REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS RECOMMENDING U.S.
IMPORT RESTRICTIONS IN CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL MATERIAL (1999)
(on file with the authors); REPORT OF THE CULTURAL PROPERTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDING EMERGENCY ACTION ON THE REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS (1998) (on file with the authors).
183. Letter from Richard R. Verma, Assistant Sec'y, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of State, to Hon. John Culberson, Member of the House of Representatives (June 18,
2009) (on file with the authors) (declining to release CPAC's recent reports on the
Chinese and Cypriot requests).
184. 19 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(6) (2006).
185. 1987 Import Restrictions on Archaeological Material from El Salvador, 52 Fed.
Reg. 34,614 (Sept. 11, 1987).
186. Ann Guthrie Hingston, U.S. Implementation of the UNESCO Cultural Property
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submitted a ten-year report to the President and Congress regarding
its implementation of the CCPIA.187 Although there has never been
any suggestion that these publications resulted in harm,
transparency of this sort is now a relic of the past.
We do not know why the State Department has chosen to cut off
information to the public about the Executive's implementation of the
CCPIA. Supporters of the secrecy have suggested that it is necessary
to protect diplomatic relations with source nations, as well as the
location of endangered cultural sites.188 Critics counter that this
secrecy is designed to conceal the State Department's statutorily-
unmoored pursuit of import restrictions, 189 which it views as
bargaining chips for use in unrelated political and diplomatic
missions.190
Although we do not purport to resolve that dispute here, we find
the lack of transparency regrettable given the openness that
previously existed, Stealth UNIDROITs troubling (and
unchallenged) findings, and the increasingly broad scope of the
Convention, in THE ETHICS OF COLLECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY, supra note 132, at xi,
129, 134-43.
187. CULTURAL PROPERTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, LOOTING, THEFT AND SMUGGLING:
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 1983-1993 (1993).
188. See JFAR Evening, supra note 157, at 42-43 (statements of Nancy C. Wilkie
and Patty Gerstenblith); Steven Vincent, Stealth Fighter: The Secret War of Maria
Kouroupas, ART & AUCTION, Mar. 2002, at 63, 67; Steven Vincent, Dealers v. USIA,
ART & AUCTION, Nov. 1997, at 44-46; Jeremy Kahn, Is the U.S. Protecting Foreign
Artifacts? Don't Ask, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at 26.
189. See IFAR Evening, supra note 157, at 39-49; id. at 33 (Jack A. Josephson's talk,
A Historical Perspective); id. at 34-36 (Kate Fitz Gibbon's talk, A Critique of CPAC); id.
at 37-39 (Jay I. Kislak's talk, The Chairman's View); Kahn, Is the U.S. Protecting
Foreign Artifacts?, supra note 188; Jeremy Kahn, U.S. Delays Rule on Limits to
Chinese Art Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, at E2 [hereinafter Kahn, U.S. Delays
Rule]; Nina Teicholz, You Can't Bring Those Antiquities Here!, WASH. POST, Dec. 24,
2000, at B05; Steven Vincent, Stealth Fighter, supra note 188, at 65; Vincent, Dealers
v. USIA, supra note 188, at 44-46; Letter from Peter K. Tompa, Counsel for the Int'l
Ass'n of Prof. Numismatists and the Prof. Numismatists Guild, to Howard J.
Krongard, Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 29, 2007) (on file with the
authors).
190. See Maria P. Kouroupas, Preservation of Cultural Heritage: A Tool of
International Public Diplomacy, in CULTURAL HERITAGE ISSUES, supra note 125, at
325 ("In recent years, the rising tide of interest in cultural preservation has made it a
palpable element of public diplomacy, particularly with respect to movable cultural
property .... ); WHO OWNS THE PAST?, supra note 133, at 12-13 (stating that "US
enforcement agencies," including the State Department, "have no incentive to tolerate,
much less promote, the importation of cultural property if the result would be to
antagonize foreign governments that might, in consequence, withhold cooperation on
matters of greater concern to the US government (such as terrorism, drug smuggling,
illegal immigration, money laundering, military bases, trade preferences, and so on)");
Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 76 ("[T]here is an unmistakable
indication that the State Department is wielding its authority to force embargoes on
political, rather than cultural property, grounds.").
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import restrictions imposed in recent years. The lack of
transparency precludes any thorough and comprehensive evaluation
of the State Department's compliance with the CCPIA. Nonetheless,
the information that is publicly available suggests that the Executive
is failing to comply with all of the CCPIA's statutory requirements.
D. The Statutory Criteria
As explained above, the first statutory criterion requires not only
that there be evidence of contemporary pillage, but that there also be
evidence of contemporary pillage affecting the specific category of
items to be restricted.191 Although Stealth UNIDROIT emphasized
this point, the Executive continues to ignore Congress' intent by
imposing import restrictions of broad scope. Perhaps the best
examples are the import restrictions recently imposed on Chinese
archaeological materials, encompassing virtually every kind of object
ranging in date from 75,000 BC to 907 AD.192 Although lack of access
to documentary evidence prevents us from assessing whether China
demonstrated a situation of contemporary pillage, as required by the
first statutory criterion, the mere scope of these restrictions raises
serious doubts regarding the Executive's compliance with that
requirement. Under the CCPIA, China was required to demonstrate
that each specific category of material within this comprehensive
embargo was currently in jeopardy of pillage. That China actually
provided such evidence requires a significant suspension of
disbelief.193
Our concerns are exacerbated by the analysis employed by CPAC
in its 2000 report on the Italian request-the most recent,
nonredacted report that has been released 194--which resulted in
broad import restrictions on several categories of archaeological
materials, ranging in date from the 9th Century BC to the 4th
Century AD.195 Rather than documenting the evidence of
191. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
192. Also included in the embargo are "monumental sculptures and wall art at least
250 years old." 2009 Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological Material
from China, 74 Fed. Reg. 2838-39 (Jan. 16, 2009) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12).
193. See James F. Fitzpatrick, Falling Short: Profound Failures in the
Administration of the 1983 Cultural Property Law, 2 A.B.A. SEC. OF INT'L L. ART &
CULTURAL HERITAGE L. NEWSL. 24, 26 (Summer 2010) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick,
Falling Short] ("[Tihe China MOU embargoed all archeological objects from prehistoric
times to the end of the Tang Dynasty. It is impossible to believe that China presented
evidence of pillage of all such objects.").
194. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
195. Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material Originating in Italy
and Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Periods, 66 Fed.
Reg. 7,399 (Jan. 23, 2001) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12); see James Cuno,
Museums, Antiquities, Cultural Property, and the US Legal Framework for Making
Acquisitions, in WHO OWNS THE PAST?, supra note 133, at 143, 153 (explaining that
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contemporary pillage affecting each specific category of restricted
material, the CPAC report briefly outlined (in less than two pages)
general looting problems facing Italy, both past (which are statutorily
irrelevant) and present.196 Notably, two CPAC members dissented
with regard to the first statutory criterion, with one of them
specifically objecting to the "procedure of making general findings for
the entire country rather than proceeding with findings on a regional
or site-by-site basis."197 This generalized analysis employed by
CPAC, coupled with the increasingly broad scope of import
restrictions being imposed, suggests that the Executive is not
adhering to the first statutory criterion.
There are similar concerns pertaining to the third statutory
criterion, requiring, inter alia, that U.S. import restrictions be
"applied in concert with similar restrictions implemented, or to be
implemented," by other nations having a significant import trade in
the restricted materials.198 In Stealth UNIDROIT, Fitzpatrick
revealed that this requirement was disregarded in the Peruvian case
because CPAC had focused solely on whether other market nations
had ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention or 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention-without regard to the concrete restrictions actually
yielded by such ratification.199 In our view, the necessity of
identifying such concrete restrictions is best illustrated by the simple
fact that market nations have varied significantly in their
implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.200 Moreover, only
after specific restrictions are identified can there be a determination,
in accordance with the CCPIA, whether they are sufficiently
"similar" to the import restrictions adopted by the United States.201
This approach is compelled by the plain language of the statute and
is in accordance with the third criterion's purpose of preventing U.S.
these import restrictions covered "virtually every kind of art object produced in or
imported to the land we now call Italy over twelve hundred years of recorded human
history").
196. See CPAC REPORT ON ITALIAN REQUEST, supra note 182, at 10-12.
197. Id. at 22.
198. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(i) (2006).
199. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
200. For example, Australia and Canada have broadly implemented the Convention
by prohibiting the import of any cultural object unlawfully exported from its country of
origin; on the other hand, Japan's implementation regime does not even account for
"[o]bjects from clandestine excavations," thus "ignor[ing] the reality of the unlawful
trade in cultural property." PATRICK J. O'KEEFE, COMMENTARY ON THE 1970 UNESCO
CONVENTION 41-42, 102-03, 126 (2d ed. 2007).
201. Focusing on the concrete restrictions adopted, rather than the mere act of
ratification, is also consistent with the fact that the CCPIA deems it irrelevant
whether the market nation is a "State Party" to the 1970 UNESCO Convention. See
19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(i) (2006).
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import restrictions from merely diverting illicit traffic elsewhere. 202
Nonetheless, a review of CPAC's 2000 report on the Italian
request again suggests that CPAC did not alter its approach. Only
with respect to one market nation (France) did CPAC attempt to
identify concrete restrictions affecting the movement of Italian
archaeological materials.203 By failing to apply this statutorily-
mandated approach to each pertinent market nation, CPAC did not
satisfy the third criterion. In this respect, CPAC failed to address
the truly difficult question here-namely, just what sort of
"restrictions" are "similar" to the import restrictions adopted by the
United States?204
202. See Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 52 ("It was recognized
that there would be no deterrent [to looting] if the United States closed its market to
certain items, but then those same cultural products simply found their way to
markets in London, Paris, Zurich, the Near East, or Tokyo. In the words of the chief
architect of the final draft of the statute, Senator Patrick Moynihan of New York, the
United States should not engage in a self-denying ordinance which merely shifts a
market from one country to another.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Vincent,
Stealth Fighter, supra note 188, at 64 (explaining that "if the U.S. is the only nation
applying a ban, the trade will simply shift elsewhere").
203. CPAC REPORT ON ITALIAN REQUEST, supra note 182, at 20 ("French customs
officials would demand an export certificate prior to allowing any archaeological object
to be imported into France. On being asked specifically whether export certificates are
required to import Italian antiquities into France, he indicated that they are
required."). Instead, CPAC again relied on whether market nations had ratified the
1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, as well as whether
they were subject to the European Union's regulatory regime on unlawfully exported
cultural property. See id. at 15, 19-20, 23-24. On the latter point, one member of
CPAC notably dissented on the ground that "how and whether" the EU regulations
were actually implemented was "unknown." Id. at 23; see also Fitzpatrick, Falling
Short, supra note 193, at 25 ("[Alnalyses and reports on the administration of these
[EU regulations] confirm that they fall far short of any comprehensive, enforced
import ban as [the United States] impose[s].").
204. We believe that the correct approach to this inquiry requires comparing the
concrete measures adopted by each pertinent market nation with the proposed U.S.
import restrictions-bearing in mind that the CCPIA describes the import restrictions
it authorizes as a "drastic" remedy. See 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2006). We note
that former CPAC member, Patty Gerstenblith, has submitted letters to CPAC
arguing that, regardless of form, any measure adopted by a market nation that is
aimed at stemming the illicit trade-including its mere ratification of a cultural
property treaty-is sufficiently "similar" to U.S. import restrictions. Letter from Patty
Gerstenblith, President, Lawyers' Comm. for Cultural Heritage Pres., to the Cultural
Prop. Advisory Comm. 3 (Feb. 25, 2008), available at http://www.culturalheritagelaw.
org/ResourceslDocuments/Letter-CambodiaExtension.doc ("The use of the word
'similar' (rather than the word 'same') in the statutory language to describe the actions
of other nations to be considered indicates that the [C]CPIA only requires that other
nations need to take similar actions that serve the underlying purpose of restricting
the trade in looted artifacts."); Letter from Patty Gerstenblith, President, Lawyers'
Comm. for Cultural Heritage Pres., to Jay Kislak, Chairman, Cultural Prop. Advisory
Comm. (Sept. 24, 2005), available at www.culturalheritagelaw.org/Resources/
Documents/Letter-ItalyExtension.doc ("[A]lthough the United Kingdom has chosen a
different method of implementing the UNESCO Convention [i.e. the creation of a new
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The third statutory criterion also requires that the Executive
determine that concerted action "would be of substantial benefit in
deterring a serious situation of pillage" before imposing import
restrictions.205 However, upon renewing import restrictions, the
Executive does not always update the designated list of restricted
items.206 Its failure to do so raises the following concern regarding
adherence to the statutory criteria for renewals: if the original import
restrictions had the anticipated effect of substantially deterring a
situation of pillage, how could the Executive find (as is statutorily
required) a contemporary situation of pillage affecting the very same
items five years later?207 If, on the other hand, the original import
restrictions did not have the anticipated effect of deterring a
situation of pillage, on what basis could the Executive find (as is
statutorily required) that concerted action five years later would
substantially deter such pillage?20
The El Salvadoran case illustrates this concern. Following the
emergency import restrictions imposed in 1987, the United States
entered a bilateral agreement with El Salvador in 1995 and
restricted the importation of pre-Hispanic artifacts.209 Although that
criminal offense], this legislation is aimed at controlling the same problem of illegal
excavation."). While we agree that the measures adopted by a market nation need not
be identical to U.S. import restrictions, we disagree that any measure attempting to
regulate the illicit trade will satisfy the statute. Indeed, such an interpretation would
render the word "similar" superfluous. See United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of
New York, 129 S. Ct. 2230, 2234 (2009) (relying on "well-established principles of
statutory interpretation that require statutes to be construed in a manner that gives
effect to all of their provisions"). In this respect, we further highlight that the statute
explicitly contemplates that those measures adopted by market nations will take the
form of "import restrictions." See 19 U.S.C. § 2602(d)(1) (2006) (requiring the
President to suspend import restrictions where market nations "have not implemented
within a reasonable period of time import restrictions that are similar to those"
imposed by the United States) (emphasis added).
205. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(i) (2006).
206. The United States has renewed bilateral agreements with the following
countries (in some cases more than once) without updating the designated list of
restricted items: Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru. By
contrast, the United States has updated the list of restricted items when renewing its
bilateral agreement with Cambodia, Cyprus, Italy, and Mali. Import Restrictions List
& Chart, US DEP'T OF STATE, http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/
listactions.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
207. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602(a)(1)(A), 2602(e)(1) (2006) (prohibiting the extension of
import restrictions unless the statutory criteria remain satisfied, including the
requirement that there be evidence of contemporary pillage affecting the items to be
restricted).
208. See id. §§ 2602(a)(1)(C)(i), 2602(e)(1) (prohibiting the extension of import
restrictions unless the statutory criteria remain satisfied, including the requirement
that international concerted action "would be of substantial benefit in deterring a
serious situation of pillage").
209. Prehispanic Artifacts from El Salvador, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,352 (Mar. 10, 1995) (to
be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12).
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bilateral agreement has been renewed and amended every five years
since then, the designated list of restricted items has not changed.210
Thus, in recently renewing the import restrictions in 2010, the
Executive would have had to determine under the law that: 1)
despite having import restrictions in place since 1995, a
contemporary situation of pillage continued to affect the same
categories of El Salvadoran items; and 2) despite the fifteen-year
history of failure to alleviate this pillage, U.S. import restrictions,
coupled with concerted international action, would substantially
deter that situation of pillage this time around.
While these examples illustrate the type and severity of the
ongoing concerns pertaining to the Executive's adherence to the law,
there are other unresolved issues. For example, the second statutory
criterion requires that the requesting nation take "measures
consistent with the [1970 UNESCO] Convention to protect its
cultural patrimony."211 It remains unclear the extent to which a
requesting nation must perform the enumerated, protective functions
listed in Article 5 of the Convention, let alone how such performance
should be assessed and whether the Executive has ever even made
such an assessment. 21 2 Moreover it remains unclear whether a
requesting country can satisfy this criterion if it has a thriving
domestic market in the proposed category of items to be restricted
from importation into the United States.213
To take another example, the third statutory criterion, in
addition to requiring concerted international action, requires that
"remedies less drastic" than import restrictions be unavailable.214
210. El Salvador, US DEP'T OF STATE, http://exchanges.state.govheritage/culprop/
esfact.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
211. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(B) (2006).
212. Article 5 of the Convention requires that States Parties "ensure the protection
of their cultural property" by establishing "one or more national services" to undertake
the following seven enumerated, protective functions: (1) drafting laws and
regulations; (2) establishing a national inventory of protected property; (3) developing
or establishing institutions ensuring the protection of cultural property; (4) organizing
supervised, archaeological excavations; (5) establishing ethical rules and principles
regarding the acquisition and transfer of cultural property; (6) educating members of
the public about the importance of cultural heritage and spreading knowledge about
the Convention's provisions; and (7) publicizing the disappearance of cultural property.
1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 8, at art. 5.
213. See, e.g., Letter from William G. Pearlstein, Counsel to Golenblock, Eiseman,
Assor, Bell & Peskoe LLP, to the Cultural Prop. Advisory Comm., at 4-5 (Feb. 17,
2005), available at http://www.golenbock.com/attorney.cfm?ID=44 (follow link on left of
page) (arguing that China's request failed to satisfy the second statutory criterion
because China encouraged a "booming domestic market" in the same materials that it
requested the United States to restrict); Fitzpatrick, Falling Short, supra note 193, at
28 (same).
214. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2006).
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This standard imposes an onerous burden on the Executive.215 It
remains unclear whether the standard requires only that the
proposed import restrictions be as narrow as possible,216 or whether
it requires that remedies less drastic than import restrictions be
unavailable.217 CPAC failed to address this statutory criterion in its
2000 report on the Italian request. 21 8
As a final example, former CPAC Chairman Jay Kislak has
commented that, not only did CPAC vote on each of the four
statutory criteria, but it took a fifth, "overall" vote on whether to
grant a request. 219 This is a baffling procedure because if any one of
the statutory criteria is not satisfied, then the inquiry should
immediately come to an end, as the statute requires that each of its
criteria be satisfied. Thus, taking such an "overall" vote is wholly
inconsistent with the statutory framework.220
E. The Ancient Coin Collectors Case
In addition to the statutory criteria, there are serious concerns
that the State Department is disregarding other important structural
features of the CCPIA as well. These concerns are illustrated by an
ongoing lawsuit brought by the Ancient Coin Collectors Guild
("ACCG"), a self-described "non-profit organization committed to
promoting the free and independent collecting of coins from
antiquity."221
In July 2007, the United States extended its bilateral agreement
with Cyprus and, for the first time in the CCPIA's history, restricted
215. Indeed, it is reminiscent of the "least restrictive alternative" test accompanying
the strict scrutiny standard that so often dooms the constitutionality of statutes. See
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 813 (2006) (concluding that
application of the strict scrutiny standard results in the challenged law being upheld
less than one-third of the time).
216. See Kimberly DeGraaf, Should the U.S. Restrict Imports of Chinese
Archaeological Materials?: An Analysis Under the Convention on Cultural Property
Implementation Act, 2 ART & MUSEUM L.J. 31, 46 (2007) ("A less drastic remedy is
available in the form of a narrower range of objects included in a request for an import
ban.
217. See id. at 48-54 (suggesting that less drastic remedies would include
strengthening laws protecting cultural property at its source, increasing the licit
market, and instituting public education programs).
218. See CPAC REPORT ON ITALIAN REQUEST, supra note 182, at 24 (concluding,
without explanation, that less drastic remedies were not available).
219. IFAR Evening, supra note 157, at 45 (statement of Jay I. Kislak).
220. In this respect, we note that a former CPAC member has commented that
"there were a lot of contortionist moves on CPAC that were made necessary because
the requests were inadequate in some way or another." Id. at 47 (statement of Kate
Fitz Gibbon).
221. ANCIENT COIN COLLECTORS GUILD, http://www.accg.usl (last visited Dec. 30,
2011).
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the importation of coins.222 Then, in January 2009, after much delay
and controversy, 223 the United States granted China's 2004 request
for import restrictions and again included coins on the list of
restricted items.224 Disappointed with the inclusion of coins, and
frustrated with the lack of transparency in the process, 225 ACCG
sought to test the legality of these import restrictions. To gain
standing, it legally purchased and imported from abroad common
Cypriot and Chinese coins valued at $275, correctly anticipating that
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol would detain and seize them.226 The
222. Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Pre-Classical and Classical
Archaeological Objects and Byzantine Period Ecclesiastical and Ritual Ethnological
Material from Cyprus, 72 Fed. Reg. 38,470 (July 13, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 12); Jeremy Kahn, U.S. Imposes Restrictions on Importing Cypriot Coins, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2007, at E3. Although CPAC apparently considered restricting the
importation of Cypriot and Italian coins in 1999, such restrictions were ultimately not
imposed. See Import Restrictions Imposed on Pre-Classical and Classical
Archaeological Material Originating in Cyprus, 67 Fed. Reg. 47,447 (July 19, 2002) (to
be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12); Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological
Material Originating in Italy and Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and
Imperial Roman Periods, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,399 (Jan. 23, 2001) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R.
pt. 12); Peter K. Tompa & Ann M. Brose, A Modern Challenge to an Age-Old Pursuit:
Can Cultural Patrimony Claims and Coin Collecting Coexist?, in WHO OWNS THE
PAST?, supra note 133, at 214; First Amended Complaint 37-40, Ancient Coin
Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Prot., No. CCB-10-322, 2011 WL 3444343
(D. Md. July 15, 2010).
223. E.g., Kahn, U.S. Delays Rule, supra note 188.
224. Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological Material from China,
74 Fed. Reg. 2,838 (Jan. 16, 2009) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12); see Autumn L.
Marton, On Rabbits, Rats and Low-Hanging Fruit: Rethinking the Impact of
International Agreements on China's Domestic Cultural Property Protection, 23
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 217, 228-38 (2009) (discussing and analyzing the U.S.-China
bilateral agreement).
Most recently, the United States has extended its MOU with Italy and
restricted the importation of certain categories of Italian coins. See Extension of
Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material Originating in Italy and
Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Periods, 76 Fed. Reg.
3,012 (Jan. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12).
225. The ACCG was involved in FOIA litigation at the administrative level on these
issues from 2004 to 2007, during which time the State Department notably refused to
disclose country requests and CPAC reports. See Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S.
Dep't of State, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 & n.1 (D.D.C. 2009). After the United States
restricted the importation of Cypriot coins, ACCG filed a lawsuit in federal court
contesting the State Department's refusal to disclose certain documents under FOIA.
Id. at 2-3. In November 2009, the district court granted the State Department's
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 3-7. Rather than wait for the resolution of the
appeal, which is currently pending, ACCG decided to use the information that it did
obtain from the FOIA process to file a separate lawsuit; that is, the lawsuit discussed
in the text.
226. First Amended Complaint, supra note 222, 3, 8, 91, 94-96; Press Release,
Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, Ancient Coin Collectors Seek Judicial Review of




lawsuit subsequently filed by ACCG (which remains ongoing at the
time of this writing)227 is the first to challenge the Executive's
compliance with the CCPIA.228 We focus here on only two of the
many allegations in that lawsuit.
First, ACCG alleged that the embargo on Cypriot and Chinese
coins exceeded the scope of the CCPIA.229 This allegation appears to
be well supported. Under the CCPIA, import restrictions may be
applied only to "archaeological or ethnological materials," which, by
definition, are limited to certain objects that are "first discovered
within, and [are] subject to export control by, the [requesting] State
Party."230 Thus, the statute prohibits the Executive from imposing
import restrictions on objects discovered outside the requesting
nation, even if they are culturally affiliated with that requesting
nation. While the rationale of this statutory prohibition is not
altogether clear-and, in this respect, it may be an appropriate topic
for statutory reform-it nonetheless appears that the Executive has
disregarded it by imposing the coin embargos.
Unlike other archaeological materials, it is generally
"impossible" to determine the "find spot" of ancient coins.231 As one
commentator explained:
Coinage seems to lack good provenance because of three factors.
First, unlike modern currency, ancient coins moved more freely
across sovereign borders in antiquity because their value was tied
to the metal's intrinsic value. This led to a far wider geographic
dispersal of coins in comparison to contemporary money, which is
generally limited to specific countries or economic zones. Therefore,
a Cypriot coin might be found in Egypt, England, or Rome. Second,
coins have been collected for centuries, indeed, since antiquity, and
some coins have traded hands innumerable times. This has
roversial-Decisions-to-Bar-Coin-Imports.aspx.
227. Shortly before this Article was published, the U.S. District Court of the District
of Maryland issued a memorandum opinion dismissing the case. Ancient Coin
Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Prot., No. CCB-10-322, 2011 WL 3444343
(D. Md. Aug. 8, 2011). There is much in that decision with which we disagree, such as
the disturbing holding that "actions taken pursuant to delegated presidential
authority under the CPIA will not be held subject to review under the [Administrative
Procedure Act]." Id. at *15 (alterations in original). While the authors intend to
address that holding (and others) elsewhere, our response here is limited, given the
late stage in the publication process when the decision was issued. The case is
currently on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
228. Press Release, Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, supra note 226.
229. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 222, 14-17, 29(a), 68, 92, 135(g)
141, 143.
230. 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2) (2006) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
231. First Amended Complaint, supra note 222, 14, 16; see also id. 68 (alleging
that the Director of the Cypriot Department of Antiquities "admitted in a private
communication" to the State Department that, with respect to ancient coins, "any
attempt to locate their exact find spot [is] extremely difficult") (alterations in original).
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resulted in the loss of provenance. Third, the very nature of coinage
as a standardized means of exchange requires that sovereigns
repeatedly reproduce near exact copies. This means that for many
coins there are several duplicates, which can make attributing a
coin to a particular find spot exceedingly difficult.
232
The import restrictions imposed on Cypriot and Chinese coins do not
account for these factors distinguishing coins from other kinds of
archaeological materials. Instead, the restrictions simply prohibit
the importation of coins that are of Cypriot and Chinese origin.233
But merely identifying coins by their country of origin fails to satisfy
the CCPIA; if this were all that were required, Congress would have
emphasized the place of "production"234 rather than the place of
"discovery."235 In sum, because it is at best "exceedingly difficult" to
determine where coins were "first discovered," there is a strong
232. Derek R. Kelly, Note, Illegal Tender: Antiquities Protection and U.S. Import
Restrictions on Cypriot Coinage, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 491, 503 (2009) (footnotes
omitted).
233. See Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological Material from
China, 74 Fed. Reg. 2,838, 2,842 (Jan. 16, 2009) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12);
Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Pre-Classical and Classical
Archaeological Objects and Byzantine Period Ecclesiastical and Ritual Ethnological
Material from Cyprus, 72 Fed. Reg. 38,470, 38,473 (July 13, 2007) (to be codified at 19
C.F.R. pt. 12).
234. Or construction, creation, manufacture, origin, etc.
235. The district court rejected this statutory argument for three reasons, none of
which we find persuasive. First, the court observed that "for objects without
documentation of where and when they were discovered, the CPIA [in § 2606(b)-(c)]
expressly places the burden on importers to prove that they are importable." Ancient
Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Prot., No. CCB-10-322, 2011 WL
3444343, at *18 (D. Md. Aug. 8, 2011). But although the burden is on the importer to
demonstrate that their object is not subject to import restrictions, those import
restrictions must comply with the CCPIA in the first instance; and the statute
provides that only "archaeological or ethnological materials"-statutorily defined as
materials that are "first discovered within, and ... subject to export control by," the
requesting nation-may be restricted from importation. Id. (internal quotation
omitted). Second, the court emphasized that "the CPIA anticipates that some
categories of materials will be designated 'by type or other appropriate classification."'
Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 2604). But that statutory language is qualified by the
requirement that "each listing made under this section shall be sufficiently specific
and precise to insure that . . . the import restrictions . . . are applied only to the
archeological and ethnological material covered by the agreement." 19 U.S.C. §
2604(1) (emphasis added). Third, the court argued that "interpreting the 'first
discovered in' requirement to preclude the State Department from barring the
importation of archaeological objects with unknown find spots would undermine the
core purpose of the CPIA, namely to deter looting of cultural property," because
"[1ooted objects are, presumably, extremely unlikely to carry documentation . . . of
when and where they were discovered and when they were exported from the country
in which they were discovered." Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 2011 WL 3444343, at
*19. While this policy argument may render the "first discovered within" language a
good candidate for statutory reform, it does not permit the Executive to simply
disregard the plain language of the statute.
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argument that the coin embargos exceed the scope of the statute. 236
Second, ACCG alleged that "China never formally requested
import restrictions on coins"237 and that the State Department
instead "created the purported request ... in house."238 If true, this
action would contravene the reactive structure of the CCPIA,'which
authorizes the Executive to impose import restrictions only in
response to a request from a foreign nation.239 Significantly, the
statute not only requires that there be such a request but also
requires that the request "be accompanied by a written statement of
the facts known to the State Party that relate" to the pertinent
statutory criteria.240 Implicit in this requirement is that any import
restriction will correspond to the situation of pillage identified by the
requesting country. Indeed, the foreign nation's request would
become a mere formality if the Executive could simply enlarge the
categories of restricted items sua sponte.241
To support this allegation, ACCG relied on several pieces of
inconclusive, circumstantial evidence.242 But because the State
236. Without access to the CPAC report on the Chinese request, we are unable to
determine whether CPAC considered that the coin embargo might exceed the scope of
the statute on this basis. With respect to the embargo of Cypriot coins, we have
obtained a heavily redacted version of the pertinent CPAC report. 2007 CPAC REPORT
ON CYPRIOT EXTENSION, supra note 182. While this report contains a brief discussion
of Cypriot coins, nowhere in the nonredacted text does the report address the "first
discovered within" requirement of the CCPIA. See id. at 21-24. We also note that
former CPAC member Patty Gerstenblith submitted a letter to CPAC arguing that
Cypriot coins constituted "archaeological materials," but the letter did not address the
"first discovered within" requirement of the statute. See Letter from Patty
Gerstenblith, President, Lawyers' Comm. for Cultural Heritage Prot., to the Cultural
Prop. Advisory Comm. (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.savingantiquities.org
pdf/ LCCHPCyprusCoinsRenewal.pdf.
237. First Amended Complaint, supra note 222, 43, 135(a).
238. Letter from Peter K. Tompa, supra note 189, at 6 (internal quotation omitted).
239. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602(a)(1), 2603(c)(1).
240. Id. §§ 2602(a)(3), 2603(c)(1).
241. The district court rejected this argument on the ground that "the CPIA does
not require that a state party's initial request include a detailed accounting of every
item eventually covered by an Article 9 agreement." Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v.
U.S. Customs and Border Prot., No. CCB-10-322, 2011 WL 3444343, at *19 (D. Md.
Aug. 8, 2011). But the allegation here is not that China failed to include such a
detailed accounting, but rather that the executive branch unilaterally imposed import
restrictions on a broad and distinct category of items (coins) that China did not
identify as being in jeopardy of pillage.
242. First, ACCG pointed out that, in the original Federal Register notice
summarizing China's request, there was no mention of coins; it was not until a few
months later that the State Department's online, public summary of China's request
(which is no longer posted) mentioned coins. First Amended Complaint, supra note
222, 41-42; see Notice of Receipt of Cultural Property Request from the Government
of the People's Republic of China, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,970 (Sept. 3, 2004). Second, ACCG
alleged that the State Department's response to a FOIA request indicated that China
never requested to restrict the importation of coins. First Amended Complaint, supra
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Department could easily refute this allegation-by disclosing just the
relevant portion of the Chinese request-its failure to do so raises
unnecessary suspicions that China did not include coins in its
request.243 Significantly, the Executive has reportedly circumvented
the "request" requirement in the past by soliciting foreign nations to
make a request. 244 In our view, such solicitation goes even beyond
enlarging the scope of a legitimate request because it effectively
eliminates the "request" requirement and reverses the reactive
nature of the statute. 245 Thus, while a lack of transparency prevents
us from discovering whether China in fact requested the United
States to restrict the importation of coins, the government's failure to
refute that allegation, coupled with its previous circumvention of the
"request" requirement, creates an inference of statutory
noncompliance.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have documented a disturbing disjunction
between the Executive's cultural property policies and the existing
legal framework established by Congress and the Judiciary. To
resolve this disjunction, we believe that statutory reform is necessary
for at least two reasons.
First, the current legal framework is antiquated: it is the product
of the 1970s, when the cultural property field had not yet emerged
note 222, 43. We have independently reviewed that FOIA correspondence and find it
inconclusive on this point. Third, and although not contained in the complaint itself,
an attorney for ACCG has asserted elsewhere, without further elaboration, that "a
reliable source close to the Chinese Embassy indicated that the Chinese had never
specifically asked for import restrictions on coins in the first place." Letter from Peter
K. Tompa, supra note 189, at 6.
243. In its motion to dismiss, the government asserted that the State Department
"received a diplomatic note from the Minister of Fine Arts of China requesting an
agreement by which the United States would impose import restrictions on
archaeological and ethnological material originating in China. The request included
information regarding coins." Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion
to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, Ancient Coin
Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Prot., No. CCB-10-322, 2011 WL
3444343, at 16 (D. Md. June 25, 2010). Again, however, this assertion could be easily
verified by disclosing the relevant portion of the Chinese request.
244. See Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 76 & n.88 ("It is ...
well documented . . . that the Canadian request was prompted by the USIA
approaching Canadian officials and urging them to request U.S. action in closing U.S.
borders to Canadian cultural objects."); Teicholz, supra note 189 (reporting that Greek
government officials informed her that CPAC staff and other American officials "had
pressured them" to request import restrictions, though apparently without success).
245. We do not mean to suggest here that a requesting nation is prohibited from
seeking or accepting assistance in preparing its request, provided that such assistance
comes after the requesting nation decides to submit a request on its own, without any
pressure by the United States. Indeed, such assistance could serve to ensure that the
resulting request satisfies the statutory criteria.
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from its embryonic state. Since then, there have been substantial
normative developments246 that have not been incorporated into the
legal framework. Instead, the statutory framework has ossified, and
judicial involvement has been sparse. These normative
developments, which largely coincide with the Executive's current
policies, favor the proactive and aggressive use of import restrictions.
While we express no view about the wisdom or efficacy of those
policies, we note that the convergence of the normative and political
landscapes creates an opportunity in which statutory reform is
practicable.
Second, statutory reform would mitigate a constitutional
dilemma. As mentioned at the outset, the disjunction between policy
and law injects the "lowest ebb" separation of powers problem into
the cultural property field.247 That, in turn, raises questions about
the scope of the Executive's constitutional authority to conduct
foreign affairs in the cultural property context, and the relationship
between any such authority and Congress' power to regulate
commerce. 248 Statutory reform would prompt discussion of these
important and novel constitutional issues.
While we have identified specific statutory issues in need of
reform, we do not attempt to describe a comprehensive strategy for
reform. We note, however, a variety of approaches Congress could
take. For example, Congress could work with the existing statutory
framework and harmonize the ways in which the NSPA and CCPIA
conflict.249 A more ambitious approach would be to remove the NSPA
from the equation altogether by substituting in its place legislation
specifically addressing stolen cultural property. Unlike the CCPIA,
the NSPA was never designed to address the unique concerns of
cultural property, 250 and its application to cultural property has
created practical and analytical difficulties.251 At the same time,
246. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
249. The CCPIA was drafted with the understanding that subsequent legislation
would overturn McClain, and therefore no attempt was made to harmonize the CCPIA
with the NSPA. Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT, supra note 160, at 862-64. But
because such legislation never passed, WHO OWNS THE PAST?, supra note 133, at 19-
21, there remain several areas in which the CCPIA and NSPA conflict. See, e.g.,
Katherine D. Vitale, Note, The War on Antiquities: United States Law and Foreign
Cultural Property, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1835, 1858-62 (2009) (summarizing the
conflicts).
250. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., Urice, supra note 3 (arguing that application of the NSPA to cultural
property can create unintended consequences-either broadening the illicit market in
unprovenanced antiquities or criminalizing American museums' continued possession
of antiquities); Adam Goldberg, Comment, Reaffirming McClain: The National Stolen
Property Act and the Abiding Trade in Looted Cultural Objects, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1031,
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Congress could revise the CCPIA to afford the Executive the greater
flexibility it apparently now exercises. For example, Congress could
clarify the metric by which to measure the efficacy of import
restrictions. While the CCPIA was originally designed to assist other
nations with cultural pillage, import restrictions now appear to be
imposed for more self-serving purposes, such as securing long-term
loans252 and -unrelated diplomatic concessions.253 The motivating
force behind these restrictions is therefore no longer apparent.
Alternatively, given the normative developments of the last
three decades, Congress could wipe the slate clean and start anew.
As a part of any such wholesale reform, Congress could address
fundamental issues. For example, Congress could examine the origin
1046-59 (2006) (summarizing common criticisms of McClain); see also supra Part I.C
(discussing how federal prosecutors failed, as a matter of law, to allege that the
Egyptian sarcophagus was "stolen" under the NSPA because they failed to allege that
it left Egypt after Egypt vested itself with ownership).
252. The Executive has sought to satisfy the fourth statutory criterion by securing
agreements from the requesting nation to provide loans of cultural objects to American
museums. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China
Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions on Categories of Archeological
Material from the Paleolithic Period Through the Tang Dynasty and Monumental
Sculpture and Wall Art at Least 250 Years Old, U.S.-China, Jan. 14, 2009, art. II, §
7(1), available at http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/culprop/chfact/pdfs/ch2009
mou.pdf; Revised Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Peru Concerning the
Imposition of Import Restrictions on Archaeological Material from the Prehispanic
Cultures and Certain Ethnological Material from the Colonial Period of Peru, U.S.-
Peru, June 9, 2007, art. II.E, available at http://exchanges.state.gov/
heritage/culprop/pefact/pdfs/ pe2007mouext.pdf.
However, there is controversy about the effectiveness of such agreements. See,
e.g., Katherine Jane Hurst, The Empty(ing) Museum: Why a 2001 Agreement Between
the United States and Italy is Ineffective in Balancing the Interests of the Source
Nation with the Benefits of Museum Display, 11 ART ANTIQUITY AND L. 55, 74-83
(2006) (discussing the limitations with the loans prompted by the 2001 U.S.-Italy
bilateral agreement and suggesting changes to same); Kaywin Feldman, Director and
President of the Minneapolis Institute of Arts, Statement to the Cultural Property
Advisory Committee Regarding the Interim Review of the Italian Memorandum of
Understanding, at 3 (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://aamd.org/advocacy/documents/
TestimonytoCPAC110909.pdf ("We have found almost no evidence of long-term loans
to large [American] museums, except for the institutions that have individual
agreements resulting from the transfer of works. The Italian loans made as a result of
American Museums transferring objects to Italy are not truly long-term loans since
these loans are not made to satisfy Article II of the MOU, but instead to satisfy an
agreement with an individual museum."); Comments of William G. Pearlstein,
Counsel to Golenbock, Eiseman, Assor, Bell & Peskoe LLP, to the Cultural Prop.
Advisory Comm. 6 (Sept. 8, 2005), available at http://www.golenbock.comdocs/outline
CPACPresentation--Italyrenewal v2.pdf (noting that there were "[r]eports that Italy
has threatened to withhold loans unless U.S. museums agree to Italy's restitution
claims").
253. See supra note 188.
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and rationale of the default rule against enforcing foreign export
laws and determine whether it should apply to cultural property.
Although this rule has been of seminal importance to the current
regulatory regime, we have been unable to locate scholarly authority
exploring its rationale in the cultural property context. 254
Moreover, Congress could address the general allocation of
cultural property responsibility within the Executive. Currently, the
Departments of Justice and State exercise primary policymaking
responsibility,255 but it is not apparent why the Department of
Commerce, for example, is not an active participant.26 It is also
unclear how (indeed, if) departments coordinate their cultural
property policies. Unlike other nations, the United States does not
have a Ministry of Culture providing for centralized coordination in
this field.257 Congress could supplement statutory reform by creating
an interagency committee to facilitate policy discussion, planning,
and coordination.
Our primary aim here is not to provide an exhaustive list of
possibilities for reform. Instead, it is to describe the disjunction
between the Executive's current cultural property policies and the
existing legal framework. In documenting this overlooked
disjunction, our hope is that stakeholders and policymakers will
254. This rule can be traced back to Paul Bator's seminal article in the Stanford
Law Review, but there is little subsequent scholarship exploring the rule's theoretical
underpinnings. Bator, supra note 139, at 287 & n.30. We nonetheless suspect that the
rule is an extension of the common law prohibition against the enforcement of foreign
revenue, penal, and other public laws. See Lawrence Collins, Professor Lowenfeld and
the Enforcement of Foreign Public Law, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 125, 129-33, 141-
46 (2009) (discussing the application of this rule to cultural heritage by two non-
American courts).
255. The Departments of Justice and State are prominent for the issues considered
here. The Department of the Interior carries primary responsibility for domestic
cultural property policy. See US DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov (last
visited Dec. 30, 2011) ("The U.S. Department of the Interior protects America's natural
resources and heritage, honors our cultures and tribal communities, and supplies the
energy to power our future.").
256. Cf. Vincent, Stealth Fighter, supra note 188, at 69 (hypothesizing that, if CPAC
had been located in the "Commerce Department-where issues of markets and free
trade are paramount-and not the State Department, the administration of the CPAC
might well be more favorable to the trade").
257. See John Henry Merryman, Art Systems and Cultural Policy, 15 ART
ANTIQUITY & L. 99, 101 n.9 (2010) (quoting Michael Kammen, Culture and the State in
America, 83 J. AM. HIST. 791, 807 (1996) ("Most industrialized nations and many of the
so-called developing ones have cabinet-level ministries of culture. Poland, Denmark,
Argentina, Haiti, and France are among the highly diverse examples. . . . The
European Economic Community has a Commissioner of Cultural Affairs; and the
European ministers of culture meet regularly on a monthly or bi-monthly basis to
discuss their differences and possible modes of comparison.")).
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recognize that the time for statutory reform is overdue and that the
opportunity to address these complex issues in open discussion and
debate is ripe.
